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SYMPOSIUM 
 
TITLE IX AT FORTY: AN INTRODUCTION 
AND HISTORICAL REVIEW OF FORTY 
LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS THAT SHAPED 
GENDER EQUITY LAW 
 
PAUL M. ANDERSON* 
Perhaps no law has received more attention in the sports industry, 
specifically within high school and collegiate sports, than Title IX.  Forty 
years after its enactment, this educational statute has truly reshaped the 
landscape of American sport.   
The purpose of this Article is to provide an introduction to forty important 
legal developments related to Title IX over the past forty years.  All of the 
United States Supreme Court decisions reviewing Title IX, many other 
important federal and state cases, the regulations, and other important agency 
guidance, are included, as they must be understood together in order to truly 
understand the impact of Title IX.  The Article follows a chronological 
progression through these developments to demonstrate how they have built 
upon each other over the past forty years.  
Although many lawyers, law students, and sports personnel have a general 
idea of what Title IX is, most do not understand or attempt to understand the 
details.  This Article focuses on those details.  It often includes the exact 
language of the cases, law, regulations, and other documents—language that is 
often ignored by practitioners and scholars—as this language provides the best 
guidance on how the law really works.  Of particular note, because Congress 
did not clarify Title IX’s impact on an educational institution until the late 
1980s, much of the focus (twenty-eight of the forty developments presented 
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Marquette Sports Law Journal, 1994–1995.  Special thanks to Julia Jaet, Reference/Administrative 
Services Librarian, Marquette University Law School, for her expert assistance in acquiring many of 
the documents used to research this Article. 
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below) is on cases and other guidance provided within the past twenty years.   
1. THE HISTORY OF TITLE IX (1964–1972) 
Although Title IX was enacted in 1972, it is important to look back before 
its enactment to truly understand its meaning and impact.  In many ways, Title 
IX was patterned after the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1  Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground 
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied 
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance.”2  This language is virtually identical to 
that in Title IX except that the Civil Rights Act does not provide a prohibition 
in relation to the sex of the individual involved.   
Title IX, itself, began to take shape in 1970 during hearings held by a 
special House Subcommittee on Education.3  The statute was first introduced 
as an amendment to the Education Amendments of 1971 and provided at that 
point that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of sex . . . be 
subject to discrimination . . . under any program or activity conducted by a 
public institution of higher education, or any school or department of graduate 
education, which is a recipient of Federal financial assistance.”4  Perhaps if 
this version of the law had gone into effect, the confusion over the types of 
entities that are subject to Title IX would not have lasted until 1987.   
At this early stage, Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana made clear that Title IX 
was based on the Civil Rights Act and that it closed the gap by prohibiting 
discrimination based on sex as well, as he noted that the language of Title IX 
“is identical language, specifically taken from [T]itle VI of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act,” and that “educational opportunity should not be based on sex, just 
as we earlier said it should not be based on race, national origin, or some of 
the other discriminations.”5  This initial version of Title IX was rejected, but it 
was reintroduced in 1972 with the language found today.6  At this point, 
Senator Bayh again clarified that this law was a direct reaction to the Civil 
Rights Act, which “unfortunately . . . does not apply to discrimination on the 
 
1. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 684–685 (1979). 
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2011). 
3. See Discrimination Against Women: Hearing Before the Spec. Subcomm. on Educ. on § 805 of 
H.R. 16098 of the Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).   
4. Amend. 398, 117 CONG. REC. 30,156 (1971). 
5. 117 CONG. REC. 30,406–07 (1971) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh). 
6. Summary: Amendment No. 874 to the Higher Education Bill, S.659, 118 CONG. REC. 5808 
(1972); Education Amendments of 1972, S. REP. NO. 92–798, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). 
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basis of sex.”7  These 1972 amendments were then an effort to “close this 
loophole” and prohibit sex discrimination as well because “our national policy 
should prohibit sex discrimination at all levels of education.”8 
Although the focus on education, and the connection to the Civil Rights 
Act, is clear, little can be found within the legislative history of Title IX that 
refers specifically to athletic programs.  The first mention of athletics is found 
in Senator Bayh’s response to a question about the initial version of the Act.  
Some worried that the Act would mandate gender-mixed sports teams, and, in 
response, he noted that:  
I do not read this as . . . mandat[ing] the desegregation of 
football fields.  What we are trying to do is provide equal 
access for women and men students to the educational process 
and the extracurricular activities in a school, where there is 
not a unique facet such as football involved.  We are not 
requiring that intercollegiate football be desegregated, nor that 
the men’s locker room be desegregated.9 
After Title IX was reintroduced, Senator Bayh also recognized that Title IX 
provides federal agencies with the rule-making authority necessary to 
effectuate the law.10  In relation to sports, then “[t]hese regulations would 
allow enforcing agencies to permit differential treatment by sex only , . . . such 
as . . . in sports facilities or other instances where personal privacy must be 
preserved.”11 
None of this language provides a direct connection to the application of 
Title IX to athletics.  Instead, this legislative history demonstrates that Title IX 
was specifically enacted to prohibit discrimination within the educational 
setting.  And as even the first case to refer to the law, Brenden v. Independent 
School District,12 makes clear, courts have repeatedly found that athletics is a 
vital and important part of the educational experience for high school and 
college students. 
2. THE LAW (1972) 
As finally enacted into law, Title IX provides that: 
 
7. 118 CONG. REC. 5807 (1972) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh). 
8. Id. 
9. 117 CONG. REC. 30,407. 
10. 118 CONG. REC. 5807. 
11. Id. 
12. See generally Brenden v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292, 1298 (8th Cir. 1973). 
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No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any education program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.13 
As gender equity law and the application of Title IX have developed over 
the past four decades, there are several important initial concepts to note.   
Title IX applies only to “programs or activities” that receive “[f]ederal 
financial assistance.”  This language led to many controversial court decisions 
and the need for further amendment of the law in the 1980s because, as first 
enacted, the law did not clearly define what a covered “program or activity” is. 
The law then prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in three general 
areas.  First, no one can “be excluded from participation in” any education 
program or activity.  In general, the focus in this first provision is on issues of 
accommodation and what will eventually be identified in a policy 
interpretation (“the Policy Interpretation”) as the “three-part” test.  This focus 
centers on making sure that actual participation opportunities are not provided 
in a discriminatory fashion. 
Second, no one can “be denied the benefits of” any education program or 
activity.  This focus typically centers on what is now known as the program 
analysis, looking at various aspects of an athletic program as listed in the 
regulations and specifically laid out in the Policy Interpretation.   
Third, no one can be “subjected to discrimination under” any education 
program or activity.  This area focuses specifically on sexual discrimination 
and harassment within athletic programs.  Although the focus within Title IX 
scholarship is often on Title IX’s accommodation provisions, sexual 
discrimination and harassment claims have received much more judicial 
review.14 
It is always important to remember that Title IX is part of the Education 
Amendments of 1972.  No part of the law includes the words “sports” or 
“athletics” or includes any specific reference to athletic programs in any way.  
As the legislative history discussed above demonstrates, Title IX was 
implemented to end sex discrimination in education.  It was not until courts 
began to connect this to their recognition of the importance of athletic 
participation as part of the overall educational experience, and when the Office 
of Civil Rights (OCR) began to provide specific guidance related to Title IX’s 
application to athletic programs, that Title IX’s application to athletics began 
 
13. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2011). 
14. Paul Anderson & Barbara Osborne, Report: A Historical Review of Title IX Litigation, 18 J. 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF SPORT 127, 161 (2008). 
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to become clear. 
3. THE FIRST CASE (1973) 
The only form of recovery provided within Title IX is the discontinuation 
of federal funding provided to a covered program or activity that violates the 
law.15   Because of this limitation, during the 1970s, there was little litigation 
attempting to use the law to fight discrimination.16 
Brenden, the first case to actually refer to the statute, was not decided until 
April 18, 1973, nine months after the law’s enactment.17  The lawsuit focused 
on civil rights claims brought by female high school students in the Minnesota 
public schools.18  At the time, the Minnesota State High School League had a 
rule barring females from participating with males in high school sports.19  
While the focus of the case was on the court’s review of the rule under the 
Equal Protection Clause,20 for the first time the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit also mentioned Title IX.  The court held that 
the rule violated the Equal Protection Clause because it banned female 
students from participating with men based on assumptions about their 
qualifications as women and not on their actual abilities to play the particular 
sport involved.21  Moreover, while discussing other landmark cases dealing 
with discrimination toward women in education, the court noted that in 
passing Title IX, “Congress has also recognized the importance of all aspects 
of education for women.”22  Perhaps setting the foundation for the review of 
sports programs by courts over the next forty years, the court recognized that 
high school sports are “‘an important and integral facet of the . . . education 
process,’” and, therefore, “[d]iscrimination in high school interscholastic 
athletics constitutes discrimination in education.”23 
 
15. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2011). 
16. According to one report, during the 1970s, there were only seven cases dealing with Title IX 
within the athletic context.  Anderson & Osborne, supra note 14, at 137. 
17. Brenden, 477 F.2d 1292.  Title IX was enacted on June 23, 1972.  20 U.S.C. § 1681. 
18. See generally Brenden, 477 F.2d 1292. 
19. See id. 
20. See id. at 1295–98. 
21. Id. at 1302. 
22. Id. at 1298. 
23. Id. at 1298 (internal citations omitted).  Although this first case referring to Title IX came 
down within the first year after its enactment, it was another two years before a court would address a 
plaintiff’s claim under the Act.  In Cape v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, 424 F. 
Supp. 732 (E.D. Tenn. 1976), several female high school students sued the Tennessee Secondary 
School Athletic Association, claiming that the rules for girls basketball were different from those 
applied to boys.  At the time, the rules required girls to play split-court, six-person basketball where 
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4. THE JAVITS AMENDMENT (1974) 
During these initial years after the enactment of Title IX, a number of bills 
were introduced attempting to stop Title IX from what some believed was its 
potential negative impact on revenue-producing sports in collegiate athletics.24  
None of these amendments passed.   
Instead, on August 21, 1974, Congress passed the Javits Amendment (also 
known as the Education Amendments of 1974), which required the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare25 (the “Department”) to 
“prepare and publish . . . proposed regulations implementing the provisions of 
[T]itle IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 relating to the prohibition of 
sex discrimination in federally assisted education programs which shall 
include with respect to intercollegiate athletic activities reasonable provisions 
considering the nature of particular sports.”26  Until this time, it was difficult 
to understand the specific application of Title IX to athletics.  This amendment 
led the Department to draft the regulations that would begin to provide 
specific details regarding what athletic departments must do in order to 
comply with the law. 
5. THE REGULATIONS (1975) 
The regulations (the “Regulations”) required by the Javits Amendment 
were published in 1975.27  The first part of the Regulations covers athletics 
and begins with a prohibition against discrimination that is virtually identical 
 
three players played offense on one side, and three played defense on the other side of the court.  Id. 
at 735.  The court denied the students’ Title IX claim, initially finding that Title IX did not provide 
for a private right of action. Id. at 738.  This issue would remain unresolved until 1979.  In addition, 
the court found that the plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies by first seeking 
redress from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.  Id.  However, the court did find that 
these rules violated the U.S. Constitution, particularly the Equal Protection Clause, because they 
denied the plaintiffs a significant educational experience based on nothing more than their sex.  Id. at 
744. 
 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the rules 
served “important governmental objectives” and were “substantially related to the achievement of 
them.”  Cape v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n., 563 F.2d 793, 795 (6th Cir. 1977).  Therefore, 
due to the “distinct differences in physical characteristics and capabilities between the sexes and that 
the differences are reflected in the sport of basketball by how the game itself is played,” the court 
found that the rules did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.  Id.  The appellate court did not 
discuss Title IX. 
24. See Diane Heckman, Women & Athletics: A Twenty Year Retrospective on Title IX, 9 U. 
MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 1, 11–12 (1992). 
25. Known as the Department of Education since 1979. 
26. Pub. L. No. 93-380, Title VII, Part D, § 844, 88 Stat. 612 (1974). 
27. Athletics, 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (2011); Financial Assistance, 34 C.F.R. § 106.37 (2011). 
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to the prohibition found in Title IX: 
No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, be treated 
differently from another person or otherwise be discriminated 
against in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or 
intramural athletics offered by a recipient, and no recipient 
shall provide any such athletics separately on such basis.28 
 After an initial provision dealing with separate teams for each sex, the 
Regulations then provide specific provisions focusing on “equal opportunity 
for members of both sexes” in any high school, college, or intramural sport.29  
In order to assess whether a recipient of federal funds (i.e., a school, 
university, or other program or activity) is providing “equal opportunity,” to 
provide some guidance for schools, and to provide some useful measures for 
those evaluating schools, the Regulations provide the following ten factors that 
may be considered: 
(1) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition 
effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of 
members of both sexes; 
(2) The provision of equipment and supplies; 
(3) Scheduling of games and practice time; 
(4) Travel and per diem allowance; 
(5) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring; 
(6) Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors; 
(7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive 
facilities; 
(8) Provision of medical and training facilities and services; 
(9) Provision of housing and dining facilities and services; and 
(10) Publicity.30 
Although the Regulations provide significant guidance on Title IX 
compliance, they would not be referred to in any reported judicial decision 
 
28. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a). 
29. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c). 
30. Id. 
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until 1992.31  Perhaps a reason for this lag is because the Regulations provided 
an “adjustment period” that gave elementary schools a year to come into 
compliance, while giving three years for high schools, colleges, and 
universities.32  With a substantial time frame to comply, potential plaintiffs 
had little reason to challenge a school when they would have already lost their 
eligibility, thus leaving them with nothing to recover.  Three years later, the 
Department was focused on the completion of what, in 1979, would become 
the Policy Interpretation. 
The second part of the Regulations deals with financial assistance.  This 
part provides that:  
[I]n providing financial assistance to any of its students, a 
recipient shall not: 
(1) On the basis of sex, provide different amount or types of 
such assistance, limit eligibility for such assistance which 
is of any particular type or source, apply different criteria, 
or otherwise discriminate;  
. . . 
(3) Apply any rule or assist in application of any rule 
concerning eligibility for such assistance which treats 
persons of one sex differently from persons of the other 
sex with regard to marital or parental status.33 
Specific to athletic scholarships, the Regulations provide that: 
(c) Athletic scholarships. 
(1) To the extent that a recipient awards athletic scholarships 
or grants-in-aid, it must provide reasonable opportunities for 
such awards for members of each sex in proportion to the 
number of students of each sex participating in interscholastic 
or intercollegiate athletics.  
(2) Separate athletic scholarships or grants-in-aid for members 
of each sex may be provided as part of separate athletic teams 
for members of each sex to the extent consistent with this 
 
31. Some of the earliest cases that refer to these regulations include Williams v. School District of 
Bethlehem, 799 F. Supp. 513 (E.D. Penn. 1992) and Cook v. Colgate University, 802 F. Supp. 737 
(N.D.N.Y. 1992). 
32. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(d).   
33. 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(a). 
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paragraph and § 106.41.34  
 Although not the specific focus of much litigation35 or scholarship 
surrounding Title IX, these Regulations clearly show that the law’s prohibition 
against discrimination applies even to the awarding of scholarships.  The 
Policy Interpretation would also pick up on these Regulations and provide 
more guidance related to financial assistance four years later. 
6. OCR GUIDANCE #1: THE MEMORANDUM (1975) 
In addition to the actual agency regulations found in the Code of Federal 
Regulations, throughout the past forty years, OCR has provided additional 
information in the form of memorandums, “Dear Colleague Letters,” 
clarifications, and guidance, presumably in an attempt to assist those 
administering sports to better understand the application of Title IX to their 
programs.  In order to truly understand how the Department interprets and 
enforces the law, one must review these documents as well.   
One of the first documents appeared after the Regulations became 
effective in a memorandum (the “Memorandum”) to chief state school 
officers, superintendents of local educational agencies, and college and 
university presidents.36  Although the Regulations became effective on July 
21, 1975, this Memorandum was sent four months later due to concerns raised 
by educational institutions related to their athletic programs.37 
This Memorandum made clear that it is “the basic responsibility of 
educational institutions to provide equal opportunity to members of both sexes 
interested in participating in the athletics programs” that they offer.38  
However, this analysis of equal opportunity was “not to be so inflexible as to 
require identical treatment in each of the matters listed” in the Regulations.39 
Although for years there was significant debate about what parts of an 
educational program were subject to the Regulations and Title IX, this 
 
34. 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c). 
35. Interestingly, although not dealing specifically with athletics, the first litigation to refer to 
these regulations appeared ten years earlier than litigation involving the regulations specific to 
athletics.  See Univ. of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Va. 1982); see also Hillsdale Coll. 
v. Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 696 F.2d 418 (6th Cir. 1982). 
36. Memorandum from Peter Holmes, Dir., Office for Civ. Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Health, Educ., 
and Welfare, to Chief State School Officers, Superintendents of Local Educ. Agencies, and Coll. and 
Univ. Presidents, Elimination of Sex Discrimination in Athletic Programs (Sept., 1975) [hereinafter 
Memorandum].  
37. Id. at 2. 
38. Id. at 3. 
39. Id. at 8. 
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Memorandum made clear that “[t]hese sections apply to each segment of the 
athletic program of a federally assisted educational institution whether or not 
that segment is the subject of direct financial support through the 
Department.”40  As a result, OCR recognized early on that separate funding 
for athletic programs “does not remove it from the reach of the statute and 
hence of the regulatory requirements.”41  In addition, foregoing a sport-by-
sport review of Title IX compliance, OCR made clear that the Regulations 
focus on “the totality of the athletic program of the institution rather than each 
sport offered.”42 
Finally, of specific importance to an understanding of what activities 
constitute a sport that may be covered by Title IX and the Regulations, OCR 
also stated that “drill teams, cheerleaders and the like . . . are not a part of the 
institution’s ‘athletic program’ within the meaning of the regulation.”43  This 
statement would receive further analysis in litigation to come.   
Although this Memorandum has not received the level of judicial 
deference seen by the Title IX clarifications or Policy Interpretation released 
in subsequent years,44 it is important because it set the stage for the frequent 
information that OCR would provide over the next forty years in its attempts 
to continuously guide educational organizations as they grappled with Title IX 
compliance. 
7. VALIDITY OF THE REGULATIONS: PART ONE (1978) 
As has happened since the Regulations were created, claimants have 
consistently sued to try to invalidate them.  One of the first parties to try was 
the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA).  In NCAA v. Califono, 
the NCAA sued the federal agency charged with enforcing Title IX, the 
Department, claiming that the Department exceeded its authority by 
promulgating the Regulations without finding that they were specifically 
consistent with the objectives of the statute.45  Specifically disagreeing with 
the Memorandum, the NCAA also argued that the Regulations should not 
 
40. Id. at 3. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 8. 
43. Id. at 3. 
44. Few courts have even mentioned this Memorandum.  However, in litigation over what a 
school district or other educational entity can legitimately define as a sport, it has become important.  
See e.g., McCormick ex rel. McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 283 n.8 (2nd 
Cir. 2004) (The school district listed cheerleading as a sport.  Although the court did not reach the 
issue of whether cheerleading was a sport, it noted that the Memorandum stated that cheerleading 
should not count as a sport). 
45. NCAA v. Califono, 444 F. Supp. 425, 429 (D. Kan. 1978). 
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apply to intercollegiate athletic programs because they do not directly receive 
federal funding.46  
The district court dismissed the claims, finding that the NCAA does not 
receive federal funding; thus, it is not subject to Title IX.47  As a result, 
although the NCAA was perhaps bringing the claim on behalf of member 
athletic departments across the country, the court found that there was no 
justiciable controversy between the Department and the NCAA.48  
8. THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER TITLE IX (1979) 
Although the law, Regulations, and Memorandum seemed to make clear 
that educational organizations could not discriminate based on sex, during the 
1970s, courts would not allow claimants to bring claims under Title IX.  As 
noted earlier, the only form of recovery provided for in the law is that if there 
is a finding of noncompliance, the offending program or activity may lose its 
federal financial assistance.49  As a result, courts reviewing the first claims 
brought by female student-athletes found that the statute did not provide a 
private cause of action that could be brought in attempt to enforce the law.50  
This status quo remained unchanged until May 14, 1979, seven months before 
the publication of the Title IX Policy Interpretation.   
Cannon v. University of Chicago, the case that led to the development of a 
private right of action under Title IX, did not involve athletics.51  Instead, a 
student sued the University of Chicago claiming that she was denied 
admission to medical school based on her sex in violation of Title IX.52 
Following the early case interpretations of Title IX, the district court dismissed 
the claim because Title IX provided no private right of action to a plaintiff.53  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.54  On 
appeal, the Supreme Court reversed.  The Court noted that Title IX was based 
on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and that the legislative history of 
Title IX demonstrated that Congress expected that, similar to Title VI, Title IX 
 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 430–31. 
48. Id. at 437. 
49. 20 U.S.C. § 1682. 
50. See Cape, 424 F. Supp. at 738; Jones v. Okla. Secondary Sch. Activities Ass’n, 453 F. Supp. 
150, 153–54 (W.D. Okla. 1977).  
51. Cannon, 441 U.S. 677. 
52. Id. 
53. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 406 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Ill. 1976). 
54. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1977). 
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would be enforced by private action.55  Therefore, although the Court 
recognized that it would be better for Congress to have included some specific 
language within the statute providing for a private right of action, it found that 
“Title IX presents the atypical situation in which all of the circumstances that 
the Court has previously identified as supportive of an implied remedy are 
present.”56   
As a result, since 1979, private plaintiffs have been able to sue schools, 
alleging that the schools’ programs or activities violate Title IX.  Seven 
months later, guidance from the Department would further clarify how Title 
IX applies to athletic departments. 
9. OCR GUIDANCE #2: THE POLICY INTERPRETATION (1979) 
Four years after the Regulations were put in place, sports administrators 
were still confused about how the Regulations, and Title IX itself, applied to 
their athletic programs.  At this point, OCR again attempted to provide further 
information to explain how the law impacted athletic programs. 
Published in the Federal Register on December 11, 1979, the Policy 
Interpretation focuses on Title IX’s application to collegiate athletics but also 
specifically how it applies to high school, club, and intramural sports.57  The 
Policy Interpretation attempts to provide further guidance on how an 
educational organization can comply with Title IX.  It also elaborates on the 
meaning of “equal opportunity” from the Regulations and provides several 
specific factors that can be used to evaluate each part of the Regulations.  
The Policy Interpretation is separated into three distinct areas:  
[1.] Compliance in Financial Assistance (Scholarships) Based 
on Athletic Ability: Pursuant to the regulation, the 
governing principle in this area is that all such assistance 
should be available on a substantially proportional basis to 
the number of male and female participants in the 
institution’s athletic program.  
[2.] Compliance in Other Program Areas (Equipment and 
supplies; games and practice times; travel and per diem, 
coaching and academic tutoring; assignment and 
 
55. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 710. 
56. Id. at 717 (emphasis in original). 
57. A Policy Interpretation: Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, OFFICE FOR CIV. RIGHTS, 
DEP’T OF EDUC. (Dec. 11, 1979), available at http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/ 
t9interp.html [hereinafter Policy Interpretation].  
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compensation of coaches and tutors; locker rooms, and 
practice and competitive facilities; medical and training 
facilities; housing and dining facilities; publicity; 
recruitment; and support services): Pursuant to the 
[R]egulation, the governing principle is that male and 
female athletes should receive equivalent treatment, 
benefits, and opportunities.  
[3.] Compliance in Meeting the Interests and Abilities of Male 
and Female Students: Pursuant to the regulation, the 
governing principle in this area is that the athletic interests 
and abilities of male and female students must be equally 
effectively accommodated.58 
 Part one, dealing with compliance in financial assistance based on athletic 
ability, takes its charge from the Regulation specific to financial assistance.59  
This part focuses on determining “whether proportionately equal amounts of 
financial assistance (scholarship aid) are available to men’s and women’s 
athletic programs.”60  The Policy Interpretation does not demand identical 
assistance for both sexes.  Instead, it calls for “substantially equal amounts” 
and notes that disparities may be allowed as a result of “legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory factors,” such as higher out-of-state tuition costs at public 
schools or decisions by schools as to how to allocate assistance in order to 
drive program development.61  The focus of this part is on the total amount of 
scholarship funding rather than the specific amount of actual scholarships 
provided to each sex.62 
Part two, dealing with “Compliance in Other Program Areas,” specifies 
factors to be used in assessing “equal opportunity” in the provision of the 
second through tenth factors provided in the Regulations.63  In addition to 
these factors, the Policy Interpretation also focuses on recruitment and support 
services.64  Known to many as the Title IX “laundry list,” these overall factors 
include the following areas: 
1. equipment and supplies,  
 
58. Id. § IV. 
59. Id. § VII(A), ¶ 1 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 106.37). 
60. Id. ¶ 2. 
61. Id. ¶ 2(a)–(b). 
62. Id. ¶ 3. 
63. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(2)(10). 
64. Policy Interpretation, supra note 57, § VII(B)(1). 
 FILENAME  \* MERGEFORMAT TITLE IX AT FORTY ARTICLE DRAFT #4.92611 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2012  3:19 PM 
338 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 22:2	
2. scheduling of games and practice times,  
3. travel and daily per diem allowances,  
4. access to tutoring,  
5. coaching,  
6. locker rooms,  
7. practice and competitive facilities,  
8. medical and training facilities and services,  
9. publicity,  
10. recruitment of student athletes, and  
11. support services.65 
Monitoring these areas for both sexes is often the focus of Title IX compliance 
within an athletic department. 
Each of these factors is then analyzed using a four-step process.  The first 
step calls for an assessment of each factor from the list “by comparing the 
availability, quality and kinds of benefits, opportunities, and treatment 
afforded members of both sexes.”66  If this initial assessment finds a disparity, 
this disparity can then be justified in the second step by certain 
nondiscriminatory factors, including “unique aspects of particular sports or 
athletic activities,” and “legitimately sex-neutral factors related to special 
circumstances of a temporary nature.”67   
If a disparity cannot be justified by a nondiscriminatory factor, the third 
step provides individual criteria that can be used to assess each part of the 
laundry list.  For example, when looking at locker rooms, practice facilities, 
and competitive facilities, OCR should examine: 
[T]he equivalence for men and women of: 
(1) Quality and availability of the facilities provided for 
practice and competitive events; 
(2) Exclusivity of use of facilities provided for practice and 
competitive events; 
(3) Availability of locker rooms; 
(4) Quality of locker rooms; 
 
65. See e.g., A Title IX Primer, WOMEN’S SPORTS FOUND., http://66.40.5.5/Content/Articles 
/Issues/Title-IX/A/A-Title-IX-Primer.aspx (last visited Aug. 14, 2011). 
66. Policy Interpretation, supra note 57, § VII(B)(2). 
67. Id. § VII(B)(2)(a), (b). 
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(5) Maintenance of practice and competitive facilities; and 
(6) Preparation of facilities for practice and competitive 
events.68 
After analyzing these particular aspects of any part of the laundry list, the 
fourth step calls for an overall assessment that looks at: 
(a) Whether the policies of an institution are discriminatory in 
language or effect; or 
(b) Whether disparities of a substantial and unjustified nature 
exist in the benefits, treatment, services, or opportunities 
afforded male and female athletes in the institution’s program 
as a whole; or 
(c) Whether disparities in benefits, treatment, services, or 
opportunities in individual segments of the program are 
substantial enough in and of themselves to deny equality of 
athletic opportunity.69 
This four-step process, used to assess “Compliance in Other Program Areas,” 
has become particularly important in the many cases dealing with scheduling 
and facility issues in high school athletics. 
The final part of the Policy Interpretation, part three, focuses on 
“Compliance in Meeting the Interests and Abilities of Male and Female 
Students.”  Although this part provides several tests and other criteria that may 
be used to assess Title IX compliance,70 no test has received more publicity 
than the three-part effective accommodation test: 
(1) Whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities 
for male and female students are provided in numbers 
substantially proportionate to their respective enrollments; 
 
68. Id. § VII(B)(3)(f). 
69. Id. § VII(B)(5). 
70. For example, the “levels of competition” test evaluates:  
(1) Whether the competitive schedules for men’s and women’s teams, on a program-
wide basis, afford proportionally similar numbers of male and female athletes 
equivalently advanced competitive opportunities; or (2) Whether the institution can 
demonstrate a history and continuing practice of upgrading the competitive 
opportunities available to the historically disadvantaged sex as warranted by 
developing abilities among the athletes of that sex. 
  Id. § VII(B)(5)(b); see also Pederson v. La. State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892, 913 (M.D. La. 1994). 
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or 
(2) Where the members of one sex have been and are 
underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, whether 
the institution can show a history and continuing practice 
of program expansion which is demonstrably responsive 
to the developing interest and abilities of the members of 
that sex; or 
(3) Where the members of one sex are underrepresented 
among intercollegiate athletes, and the institution cannot 
show a continuing practice of program expansion such as 
that cited above, whether it can be demonstrated that the 
interests and abilities of the members of that sex have 
been fully and effectively accommodated by the present 
program.71 
 This test has become the focal point of much of the Title IX litigation and 
scholarship that has followed in the past three decades.  Although it has been 
subject to much debate, what is important to remember is that OCR made clear 
in the Policy Interpretation that, regardless of the fact that this has come to be 
known as the “three-part” test, compliance is not based on an overall 
evaluation of each part.  Instead, compliance is based on whether a program 
meets “any one” of the particular tests above.72  
10. VALIDITY OF THE REGULATIONS: PART TWO (1982) 
Three years after Cannon and the introduction of the Policy Interpretation, 
another Title IX case made its way to the Supreme Court, again in a case that 
did not specifically deal with sport.   
In North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, a tenured teacher in the North 
Haven public school system filed a complaint with the Department, claiming 
that the school board had violated Title IX by refusing to rehire her after she 
returned from maternity leave.73  In response, following its regulations related 
to employment, the Department asked the school board for its employment 
policies.74  The board refused, claiming that the Department did not have the 
authority to regulate its employment practices.75  As a result, the Department 
 
71. Policy Interpretation, supra note 57, §VII(B)(5)(a). 
72. Id. 
73. 456 U.S. 512 (1982). 
74. Id. at 517. 
75. Id. 
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notified the board that it would consider administrative proceedings under 
Title IX in order to revoke its federal funding.76  The board sued, asking the 
court to declare that the Department exceeded its authority and to prohibit the 
Department from trying to revoke its federal funding.77   
The district court sustained the board’s complaint and found that Title IX 
was not intended to apply to employment practices.78  On appeal, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, finding that Title IX 
did apply to employment, but it also declined to decide whether the 
Department could revoke federal funding in this case, as it had not yet 
attempted to do so.79  Due to a conflict among the federal courts on this issue, 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari.80 
In its review, the Supreme Court found that both the statutory language 
and legislative history of the law supported the conclusion that employment 
discrimination is prohibited under Title IX.81  In addition, Congress had 
already reviewed the Department’s Title IX Regulations and, to date, had not 
taken issue with the Regulations specific to employment.82  Therefore, the 
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Second Circuit and upheld the 
Department’s authority under Title IX to implement employment regulations 
and to force the school board to comply with them.83 
Although this case does not discuss the sports context, employment 
discrimination is one of the leading issues in Title IX litigation.84  North 
Haven also demonstrates that courts should defer to the rules and regulations 
put forth by the federal agency empowered to enforce the particular federal 
law.  In the Title IX context, this has led to the general deference that courts 
typically give to the Title IX Regulations and Policy Interpretation, as well as 
to later clarifications and even Dear Colleague Letters, all interpreting Title 
IX’s prohibitions against sex discrimination. 
 
76. Id. at 518. 
77. Id.  
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 519. 
80. Id. at 520. 
81. Id. at 530. 
82. Id. at 533–34 (citing Part 86 – Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs 
and Activities Receiving or Benefiting from Federal Financial Assistance, 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 
(1975)). 
83. Id. at 540. 
84. Anderson & Osborne, supra note 14, at 136 (In a study of Title IX litigation from 1972 until 
2007, 19% of the cases studied, or 37 cases, focused on claims of employment discrimination.). 
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11. THE SUPREME COURT LIMITS THE APPLICATION OF TITLE IX (1984) 
Two years after the North Haven decision, the Supreme Court would again 
review a Title IX challenge.  After Cannon and North Haven, it was clear that 
individuals could use Title IX to bring discrimination claims against 
educational programs.  However, whether they could also bring claims against 
a program’s athletic department was unclear.  At this point in the history of 
Title IX, the actual definition of a “program or activity” receiving “federal 
financial assistance” was unclear.  In North Haven, without defining what a 
covered “program” might be, the Supreme Court supported a program-specific 
reading of the statute,85 noting that “Congress failed to adopt proposals that 
would have prohibited all discriminatory practices of an institution that 
receives federal funds.”86  The Court would confirm this view of Title IX’s 
application in 1984 in Grove City College v. Bell.87 
In Grove City, students at a private, liberal arts college received aid from 
Basic Educational Opportunity Grants (BEOGs) provided by the school.88  
The college followed the Alternative Disbursement System (ADS) for 
disbursing these BEOGs, wherein the students received their aid directly from 
the Department.89  As a result of these disbursements, the Department found 
that the college was a recipient of federal funds covered by Title IX and 
required it to complete the “Assurance of Compliance” form.90  Once the 
college refused to complete the form, the Department initiated administrative 
proceedings to declare the college and its students ineligible to receive federal 
funding due to the school’s failure to comply with Title IX.91  The college then 
sued the Department, arguing that Title IX did not apply to the BEOGs for its 
students.92  
The Supreme Court initially found that receipt of federal funding by the 
students was enough to subject the college to Title IX.93  However, the Court 
limited this application specifically to the school’s financial aid program and 
not to the entire school itself, as it concluded that “the receipt of BEOG’s by 
some of Grove City’s students does not trigger institutionwide coverage under 
Title IX.  In purpose and effect, BEOG’s represent federal financial assistance 
 
85. N. Haven Bd. of Educ., 456 U.S. at 536–40. 
86. Id. at 537 (emphasis in original). 
87. 465 U.S. 555 (1984). 
88. Id. at 558. 
89. Id. at 559. 
90. Id. at 560. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 561. 
93. Id. at 568–69. 
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to the College’s own financial aid program, and it is that program that may 
properly be regulated under Title IX . . . .”94  In essence then, the Court read 
the “program and activity” language within the statute to limit the application 
of Title IX to only the specific program or activity that receives federal 
financial aid. 
After the Grove City decision, unless an athletic department itself received 
some form of direct federal funding, it did not need to worry about compliance 
with Title IX, the Regulations, or even the Policy Interpretation.  For the next 
three years, courts followed this decision, dismissing Title IX claims against 
athletic and other university departments where there was no specific finding 
that these departments received federal funding.95 
12. CONGRESS REESTABLISHES THE REACH OF TITLE IX (1988) 
By Title IX’s fifteenth anniversary in 1987, the law’s impact on athletics 
had been insignificant at best, as courts continued to dismiss claims against 
athletic departments.  Congress soon took the initiative and proposed the Civil 
Rights Restoration Act in specific response to the Grove City decision because 
the decision “significantly narrowed the scope of four civil rights statutes, 
and . . . the basic civil rights of women, minorities, the elderly[,] and the 
disabled, have been threatened, denied, and ignored with no redress.”96  
Seeking to “restore the broad scope of coverage and to clarify the 
application of title IX . . . ,”97 Congress passed the Civil Rights Restoration 
Act (the “Act”) on March 22, 1988.98  The Act defines the term “program or 
activity” for purposes of Title IX as follows: 
[T]he term “program or activity” and “program” mean all of 
the operations of— 
. . . 
(2) 
(A) a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or 
a public system of higher education; or 
 
94. Id. at 573–74. 
95. See e.g., O’Connor v. Peru State Coll., 605 F. Supp. 753 (D. Neb. 1985); Lantz v. Ambach, 
620 F. Supp. 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); O’Connor v. Peru State Coll., 781 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1986); 
Bennett v. W. Tex. State Univ., 799 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1986); EEOC v. Madison Cmty. Unit Sch. 
Dist., 43 Fair Emp’t. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1410 (1986). 
96. 134 CONG. REC. H1038 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1988) (statement of Rep. Oakar). 
97. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1987). 
98. Civil Rights Restoration Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (2011).   
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(B) a local educational agency . . . , system of vocational 
education, or other school system; 
(3) 
(A) an entire corporation, partnership, or other private 
organization, or an entire sole proprietorship— 
(i) if assistance is extended to such corporation, partnership, 
private organization, or sole proprietorship as a whole; or 
(ii) which is principally engaged in the business of providing 
education, health care, housing, social services, or parks and 
recreation; or 
. . . 
any part of which is extended Federal financial 
assistance, . . .99 
 The Act makes clear that Title IX compliance is institution-wide; it is not 
focused on only a specific program or activity that receives federal financial 
assistance.  Coupled with Title IX’s definition of an “educational institution” 
as “any public or private preschool, elementary, or secondary school, or any 
institution of vocational, professional, or higher education,”100  the Act makes 
clear that if any part of a school or university receives federal financial 
assistance, then Title IX compliance should reach the athletic department as 
well. 
13. OCR GUIDANCE #3: INVESTIGATOR’S MANUAL (1990) 
Throughout its first two decades, the Department provided significant 
guidance on the application of Title IX and its prohibition of sex 
discrimination in athletics.  However, until the clarification provided by the 
Act in 1988, the specific application of Title IX to athletic departments was 
still not clear.  Regardless of this lack of clarity, OCR continued to provide 
guidance to schools about the application of Title IX to athletics.   
In 1980, OCR developed an “Interim Title IX Intercollegiate Athletics 
Manual” (the “Interim Manual”), providing some guidance to government 
investigators as they reviewed athletic department compliance with Title IX 
and its regulations.101  In 1982, OCR issued “Guidance on Writing 
Intercollegiate Athletic Letters of Findings.”102  Although both of these 
 
99. Id. 
100. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(c).   
101. LINDA JEAN CARPENTER & R. VIVIAN ACOSTA, TITLE IX 15 (2005). 
102. Id. 
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documents were available, due to the limitations imposed by the Grove City 
decision, it was not until the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1988 that OCR 
considered replacing the Interim Manual, and, in 1990, OCR issued the “Title 
IX Investigator’s Manual” (the “Investigator’s Manual”).103  The 
Investigator’s Manual was created to “assist investigators of the Office for 
Civil Rights . . . in the investigations of interscholastic and intercollegiate 
athletics programs offered by educational institutions required to comply with 
Title IX.”104  Although the Investigator’s Manual is not considered to be 
specific guidance for schools or other educational institutions on how they 
must comply with Title IX, courts have referred to it in their analysis of Title 
IX.105  The Investigator’s Manual includes thirteen sections providing 
methods that can be used to investigate each of the program elements provided 
in the Regulations and Policy Interpretation.  It also contains appendices with 
model letters of findings, investigative plans, and other information.106 
 The Investigator’s Manual is not an official interpretation of Title IX or 
its Regulations and Policy Interpretation.  However, as the agency’s specific 
guidance that it provided to its own investigators charged with reviewing Title 
IX compliance, it is an important document that many look to in order to 
understand how to comply with Title IX.107 
14. THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER TITLE IX (1992) 
After the enactment of the Act, it was clear that athletic departments 
needed to specifically comply with Title IX, and litigation in this area 
increased; however, the actual form of recovery was still unclear.  The 
Supreme Court began to clarify this confusion in 1992. 
 
103. VALERIE BONNETTE & LAMAR DANIEL, OFFICE FOR CIV. RIGHTS, DEP’T OF EDUC., TITLE 
IX ATHLETICS INVESTIGATOR’S MANUAL (1990). 
104. Id. at Introduction. 
105. See, e.g., McCormick, 370 F.3d at 293 n.14. 
106. BONNETTE & DANIEL, supra note 103, at 105–52.  The Investigator’s Manual also includes 
a “Title IX Coaching Compensation Policy Clarification” produced by OCR in 1983.  Id. at 166.  The 
Title IX Coaching Compensation Policy Clarification related to a question as to whether Title IX 
prohibits  disparate coaching salaries based on the sex of the students receiving coaching services, 
rather than on the sex of the coaches providing coaching services.  Id.  With this Clarification, OCR 
made clear that the focus of the Title IX Regulations is on the sex of the employee and not the sex of 
the students involved.  Id. at 167.  
107. The United States Department of Justice has also produced a similar manual.  Its “Title IX 
Legal Manual” is “intended to be an abstract of general principles and issues for use by various 
federal agencies charged with enforcing Title IX”; however, similar to OCR’s manual, it “is not 
intended to provide a complete, comprehensive directory of all cases or issues related to Title IX.”  
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TITLE IX LEGAL MANUAL (2001), available at http://www.justice.gov 
/crt/about/cor/coord/ixlegal.php. 
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In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, Christine Franklin was a 
student at North Gwinnett High School.108  A teacher and coach, Andrew Hill, 
subjected her to repeated sexual harassment over a two-year span, asking her 
about sexual experiences and whether she would consider having sex with an 
older man.109  The school was notified about his behavior but took no action to 
stop it.110  In fact, teachers and school administrators discouraged Franklin 
from pressing charges.111  Hill resigned on the condition that all matters 
pending against him be dropped, and the school subsequently closed its 
investigation into the matter.112  
Franklin sued, seeking damages from the school for allowing the 
harassment to continue.  The district court dismissed her complaint, finding 
that Title IX does not allow for an award of damages.113  The specific issue for 
the Supreme Court on appeal was whether monetary damages should be 
available to a plaintiff alleging discrimination under Title IX.114  The Supreme 
Court made clear that, although in Cannon it had to examine “the text and 
history” of Title IX in order to determine whether Congress intended to create 
a private right of action under the statute, it would “presume the availability of 
all appropriate remedies unless Congress has expressly indicated 
otherwise.”115  Finding that Congress had not limited the remedies available 
under Title IX, the court found that “a damages remedy is available for an 
action brought to enforce Title IX.”116   
The Franklin decision not only provided relief for Title IX claimants, but 
it also provided an incentive for those student-athletes or others suffering 
sexual harassment, who, for the first two decades after the enactment of the 
law, could not be guaranteed that their complaints would receive any relief.  
Although these individuals possessed a right of action after 1979, it was not 
until 1992 that they were assured that they also might be able to receive some 
sort of monetary award as a result of a finding of sexual discrimination.  
Perhaps it is not surprising then, that after this decision, “Title IX litigation 
saw its first large spike in litigation with 24 decisions from the end of 1992 
 
108. 503 U.S. 60 (1992). 
109. Id. at 63.  Although not discussed in depth in this case, sexual harassment has been an 
actionable form of prohibited sexual discrimination under Title IX since 1977.  See Alexander v. Yale 
Univ., 459 F. Supp. 1 (D. Conn. 1977). 
110. Franklin, 503 U.S., at 63. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 64. 
113. Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 911 F.2d 617 (11th Cir. 1990). 
114. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 62–63.  
115. Id. at 66. 
116. Id. at 76. 
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until 1995.”117  
15. ELIMINATION OF OPPORTUNITIES: PART ONE (1993) 
As schools were forced to continue to come into compliance with the 
parameters of Title IX in the early 1990s, the focus was typically on 
opportunities to participate and the Policy Interpretation’s three-part test.  As 
schools faced difficult budgetary decisions, they often decided to cut athletic 
programs and opportunities for students within those programs, in order to cut 
costs.  Many schools decided to simultaneously cut opportunities for men and 
women.  When athletic opportunities are cut, student athletes who can no 
longer participate in athletics often challenge these decisions in court.  The 
first important cases in this area focused on female student athletes’ claims 
that cutting their participation opportunities violated Title IX.   
In Favia v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania, as a result of budgetary 
concerns, Indiana University of Pennsylvania decided to cut four varsity 
athletic programs, including men’s tennis and soccer and women’s gymnastics 
and field hockey.118 At the time, enrollment at the university was 55.6% 
female and 44.4% male, while participation in athletics was 62% male and 
38% female; participation numbers that would not meet the proportionality 
part of the three-part test.119  Several gymnasts and field hockey players sued, 
claiming that the university was currently violating Title IX and that the cut 
teams should be restored.120  The district court held that the university violated 
Title IX because it could not meet any part of the three-part test, and it also 
ordered the university to reinstate the gymnastics and field hockey teams.121  
The university asked the court to allow it to add a new women’s soccer team 
instead of the gymnastics team, but the court denied its request.122  The 
university then appealed. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, noting 
that “it is not clear that the University’s proposed substitution of soccer for 
gymnastics will substantially ameliorate what the district court decided was 
likely to be a violation of Title IX.”123   
Although limited to the specific situation involved, the Favia case was 
 
117. Anderson & Osborne, supra note 14, at 150. 
118. 7 F.3d 332 (3rd Cir. 1993). 
119. Id. at 335. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 335–36. 
122. Id. at 336–37. 
123. Id. at 343. 
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important in showing that if a university was not in compliance with Title IX, 
it could not cut opportunities to women, the already underrepresented sex.  
Budgetary considerations such as those cited by the university were not an 
excuse for it to violate federal law.  In situations where a school cannot show 
that it provides more than proportionate opportunities for women (i.e., the 
percentage of women participating in sports is higher than the percentage of 
overall enrollment), cannot show a continuing practice of expanding 
opportunities for women, and has no evidence of attempting to meet the 
interests and abilities of its female students, it will not be able to cut 
opportunities for women in athletics.  Even in this case where, after cutting 
both men’s and women’s teams, the school could increase its overall 
percentage of opportunities for women,124 it still violated Title IX because its 
overall participation percentages were not proportionate. 
In times of economic hardship, few schools will be able to satisfy Title 
IX’s effective accommodation requirement by continuing to expand their 
women’s athletics programs.  Nonetheless, the ordinary meaning of the word 
“expansion” may not be twisted to find compliance under this prong when 
schools have increased the relative percentages of women participating in 
athletics by making cuts in both men’s and women’s sports programs.125 
16. ELIMINATION OF OPPORTUNITIES: PART TWO (1994) 
When schools are faced with difficult budgetary considerations they often 
cut male sports.  Several cases have addressed whether the elimination of male 
sports opportunities violates Title IX.  In the initial cases in this area, members 
of eliminated male teams sued universities, alleging violations of Title IX.  
One of the earliest cases, Kelley v. Board of Trustees, dealt with a claim by 
members of a men’s swimming team cut at the University of Illinois in 
1993.126 
In 1982, OCR determined that the university was not providing equal 
athletic opportunities to its female students, but because the university 
promised to take care of the problem in a reasonable time, OCR did not find 
that it was in violation of Title IX.127  However, by 1993, the university still 
failed part one of the three-part test because, while 44% of its students were 
female, only 23.4% participated in athletics.128  At the same time, faced with a 
 
124. Id. at 336. 
125. Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 830 (10th Cir. 1993). 
126. Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1128 (1995). 
127. Id. at 269. 
128. Id. 
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budget deficit in the athletic department, the university decided to eliminate 
four teams, including men’s swimming.129  The men sued, claiming that the 
university violated Title IX when it cut the swimming team.130 
The plaintiffs argued that the Title IX Regulations and Policy 
Interpretation, specifically the substantial proportionality test, had turned Title 
IX into “a statute that mandates discrimination against males.”131  This type of 
argument would be repeated in litigation by male advocates in subsequent 
years.  In Kelley, the court disagreed, noting that “where Congress has 
specifically delegated to an agency the responsibility to articulate standards 
governing a particular area, we must accord the ensuing regulation 
considerable deference,” and that “[t]his Court must defer to an agency’s 
interpretation of its regulations if the interpretation is reasonable . . . a standard 
the policy interpretation at issue here meets.”132  Moreover, when the 
university cut the men’s swimming team, its “actions were consistent with the 
statute and the applicable regulation and policy interpretation.”133  Therefore, 
affirming the decision of the district court, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit found that the school could “eliminate the men’s 
swimming program without violating Title IX since even after eliminating the 
program, men’s participation in athletics would continue to be more than 
substantially proportionate to their presence in the University’s student 
body.”134   
Another interesting part of this case relates to the argument that many 
advocates for Title IX and female sports put forth.  They often argue that the 
purpose of Title IX is to create interest and participation opportunities for 
women.  While addressing the plaintiff’s attempt to argue that Title IX 
violated the U.S. Constitution, the Seventh Circuit noted that: 
Title IX need not require—as plaintiffs would have us 
believe—that the opportunities for the underrepresented group 
be continually expanded. Title IX’s stated objective is not to 
ensure that the athletic opportunities available to women 
increase. Rather its avowed purpose is to prohibit educational 
 
129. Id. 
130. Id.  
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 270–71. 
133. Id. at 272. 
134. Id. at 270. 
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institutions from discriminating on the basis of sex.135 
The court noted this as it recognized that at times schools must be allowed to 
eliminate opportunities for the overrepresented sex (males) because, “in 
instances where overall athletic opportunities decrease, the actual 
opportunities available to the underrepresented gender do not.”136  Although 
not specifically answering the arguments about the true purpose of Title IX, 
the court made it clear that the elimination of male opportunities can be a 
viable tool used by schools in their attempts to comply with Title IX.  This 
analysis would be repeated in the 1996 and 2003 clarifications and in similar 
litigation in the future.137 
17. REPORTING ON TITLE IX (1994) 
As many schools attempted to comply with Title IX, it was difficult for 
student-athletes to readily find information about the benefits and 
opportunities schools were providing to their students athletes.  Congress 
passed the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act (EADA) in 1994,138 in response 
to the “increasing concern among citizens, educators, and public officials 
regarding the athletic opportunities for young men and women at institutions 
of higher education.”139  The EADA focuses on prospective students and 
student-athletes who “should be aware of the commitments of an institution to 
providing equitable athletic opportunities for its men and women students,” 
because such knowledge would help them “make informed judgments about 
the commitments of a given institution of higher education to providing 
equitable athletic benefits to its men and women students.”140   
Under the EADA, institutions are required to prepare annual reports 
including undergraduate attendance, information on varsity sports teams, 
money spent on athletically related student aid, recruiting expenses, revenues, 
salaries, and overall expenses.141  This information can then be accessed 
online on the U.S. Department of Education’s Equity in Athletics Analysis 
Cutting Tool.142 
 
135. Id. at 272. 
136. Id. 
137. See, e.g., Miami Univ. Wrestling Club v. Miami Univ., 302 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 2002). 
138. Disclosure of Athletic Program Participation Rates and Financial Support Data, Pub. L. No. 
103–382, § 360B (1994). 
139. Id.; 20 U.S.C. § 1092 n.(b)(3). 
140. § 1092 n.(b)(7)–(8). 
141. Id. § 1092(g). 
142. The Equity in Athletics Data Analysis Cutting Tool, OFFICE OF POSTSECONDARY EDUC., 
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Although focused on providing information for prospective students, the 
information reported under the EADA is frequently used in cases alleging 
violations of Title IX, specifically in regard to part one of the three-part test,143 
and allegations of program inequalities.144 
18. OCR GUIDANCE #4: THE CLARIFICATION (1996) 
As schools continued to grapple with Title IX compliance, and specifically 
with how to meet the requirements of the three-part test, OCR stepped in to 
provide more guidance in the form of a policy clarification (the “1996 
Clarification”).145  In the letter accompanying the 1996 Clarification, OCR 
made clear that the 1996 Clarification simply provides an updated explanation 
of the Policy Interpretation, which “has also enjoyed the support of every court 
that has addressed issues of Title IX athletics.”146  OCR also reasserted that 
“institutions need to comply only with any one part of the three-part test in 
order to provide nondiscriminatory participation opportunities for individuals 
of both sexes.”147  
As to the first part of the three-part test, when assessing whether a school 
provides athletic opportunities to members of each sex proportional to its 
enrollment, OCR looks to the number of actual participation opportunities 
provided to male and female athletes.  Overall, these participation 
opportunities “must be real, not illusory,” and such participants will only be 
athletes:  
a. Who are receiving the institutionally-sponsored support 
normally provided to athletes competing at the institution 
involved, e.g., coaching, equipment, medical and training 
 
http://ope.ed.gov/athletics/ (last visited Aug. 12, 2011).  The Department also has a website 
containing similar information for interscholastic institutions and school districts.  See Civil Rights 
Data Collection, OFFICE FOR CIV. RIGHTS, http://ocrdata.ed.gov/Default.aspx (last visited Aug. 12, 
2011). 
143. See, e.g., Brust v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 2007 WL 4365521, *4 (E.D. Cal. 2007). 
144. See, e.g., Barrett v. W. Chester Univ. of Penn. of State Sys. of Higher Educ., 2003 WL 
22803477, *6 (E.D. Pa. 2003). 
145. Norma Cantu, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics 
Policy Guidance: The Three-Part Test, OFFICE FOR CIV. RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Jan. 16, 
1996), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/clarific.html [hereinafter 
Clarification]. 
146.  Norma Cantu, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter: Clarification of 
Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance: The Three-Part Test, OFFICE FOR CIV. RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T 
OF EDUC. (Jan. 16, 1996), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/clarific.html 
[hereinafter January 1996 Letter]. 
147. Id. 
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room services, on a regular basis during a sport’s season; 
and  
b. Who are participating in organized practice sessions and 
other team meetings and activities on a regular basis 
during a sport’s season; and  
c. Who are listed on the eligibility or squad lists maintained 
for each sport, or  
d. Who, because of injury, cannot meet a, b, or c above but 
continue to receive financial aid on the basis of athletic 
ability.148 
Within this determination of participants, OCR will include “among others, 
those athletes who do not receive scholarships (e.g., walk-ons), those athletes 
who compete on teams sponsored by the institution even though the team may 
be required to raise some or all of its operating funds, and those athletes who 
practice but may not compete.”149   
 Although many schools feared that OCR would force them to provide 
equal opportunities to men and women, or at least opportunities that exactly 
match enrollment, the 1996 Clarification made clear that after determining 
who should count as an athletic participant, OCR will then determine whether 
such opportunities are substantially proportionate, analyzing an “institution’s 
specific circumstances and the size of its athletic program . . . on a case-by-
case basis, rather than through use of a statistical test.”150  Thus, the first part 
does not require exact proportionality in all cases. 
The second part of the three-part test focuses on a demonstration of a 
history and continuing practice of program expansion for the underrepresented 
sex.  In order to assess compliance with this test, OCR will focus on two areas.  
With regard to finding evidence that an institution has a history of program 
expansion, it will look to:  
  an institution’s record of adding intercollegiate teams, or 
upgrading teams to intercollegiate status, for the 
underrepresented sex;  
  an institution’s record of increasing the numbers of 
participants in intercollegiate athletics who are members 
of the underrepresented sex; and  
 
148. Clarification, supra note 145. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
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  an institution’s affirmative responses to requests by 
students or others for addition or elevation of sports.151  
In assessing whether there is evidence of a continuing practice of program 
expansion, OCR will look to:  
  an institution’s current implementation of a 
nondiscriminatory policy or procedure for requesting the 
addition of sports (including the elevation of club or 
intramural teams) and the effective communication of the 
policy or procedure to students; and  
  an institution’s current implementation of a plan of 
program expansion that is responsive to developing 
interests and abilities.152  
A school cannot show a history or continuing practice of program expansion 
for women by merely cutting opportunities for men in order to increase the 
percentage of participation for women, as OCR made clear that if “an 
institution increases the proportional participation opportunities for the 
underrepresented sex by reducing opportunities for the overrepresented sex 
alone” it will not comply with part two of the three-part test.153  Overall, 
schools must be able to show that they have responded to the projected 
interests of their female students by elevating or adding sports over time. 
Finally, specific to the third part of the test focusing on accommodation of 
the interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex, OCR initially made 
clear that schools must accommodate the interests of all admitted and enrolled 
students.154  The 1996 Clarification also notes that it is possible for a school to 
meet this part, even if there is a low rate of participation by female students, as 
long as the school can still show that it is meeting the interests and abilities of 
its student population.155   
When assessing whether a school complies with this part, OCR will 
analyze “whether there is (a) unmet interest in a particular sport; (b) sufficient 
 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Id.  This is a controversial point.  It seems clear that OCR was permitting a situation where, 
if a school found little interest in athletic participation among its female student body, it did not have 
to provide athletic opportunities for these students.  Many Title IX advocates argue instead that it is a 
school’s responsibility to foster and create interest among female students.  These arguments came 
together in the backlash faced by the recently rescinded Additional Clarification.  See infra note 305. 
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ability to sustain a team in the sport; and (c) a reasonable expectation of 
competition for the team.”156  Of particular importance to institutions that face 
budgetary constraints and see no alternative but to cut teams, the 1996 
Clarification makes clear that “[i]f an institution has recently eliminated a 
viable team from the intercollegiate program, OCR will find that there is 
sufficient interest, ability, and available competition to sustain an 
intercollegiate team in that sport unless an institution can provide strong 
evidence that interest, ability, or available competition no longer exists.”157 
Overall, for those schools seeking to cut opportunities for student-athletes, 
the 1996 Clarification made clear that they could choose to cap or eliminate 
opportunities for the overrepresented sex (men) in order to comply with the 
first part of the three-part test.158  However, although cutting men’s 
opportunities is allowed under part one as a way to come in to proportionality, 
“nothing in the three-part test requires an institution to eliminate participation 
opportunities for men,” as such cuts would not help an institution meet the 
requirements of parts two or three because both “measure an institution’s 
positive, ongoing response to the interests and abilities of the underrepresented 
sex.”159 
19. APPLICATION OF THE THREE-PART TEST AND A SAFE HARBOR (1996) 
Ten months after the publication of the 1996 Clarification, the First Circuit 
referred to it, along with the Regulations, Policy Interpretation, and the 
statutory framework of Title IX, as it decided an important case involving 
Brown University.   
In Cohen v. Brown University, realizing the same budgetary concerns 
faced by Indiana University of Pennsylvania, Brown University dropped 
women’s volleyball and gymnastics and men’s golf and water polo.160  As in 
Favia, the female student-athletes from the eliminated sports sued, asking the 
court to reinstate their teams.161  Brown University argued that the court 
should not follow the Regulations or the Policy Interpretation, thereby forcing 
it to comply with the three-part test because the Policy Interpretation, in 
particular, conflicts “‘with the Constitution, the Statute, the Regulation, other 
Agency materials and practices, existing analogous caselaw, and in addition, is 
 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. January 1996 Letter, supra note 146. 
160. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978 (D. R.I. 1992). 
161. Id. 
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bad policy.’”162   
In response, the court made it clear that the Regulations “deserve 
controlling weight” and “that the Policy Interpretation warrants substantial 
deference . . . ‘because the agency’s rendition stands upon a plausible, if not 
inevitable, reading of Title IX.’”163  The court also relied on the 1996 
Clarification because, while it did “not change the existing standards for 
compliance,” it “does provide further information and guidelines for assessing 
compliance under the three-part test.”164  The court then affirmed the district 
court’s holding that Brown University did not meet any part of the three-part 
test.  Therefore, its athletic program was in violation of Title IX, and it was 
required to reinstate the women’s volleyball and gymnastic teams.165   
The Cohen case is also important because it followed the 1996 
Clarification, which also identified the first part of the three-part test as a “safe 
harbor.”166  The court explained that “a university [that] does not wish to 
engage in extensive compliance analysis may stay on the sunny side of Title 
IX simply by maintaining gender parity between its student body and its 
athletic lineup.”167  What the court did not specify was how to exactly 
determine whether a school could be in the “safe harbor” zone. 
 The Cohen court also followed the 1996 Clarification and recognized that 
cutting male opportunities is a “permissible” way to meet the proportionality 
requirement.168  After this case, many schools thought that the only part of 
Title IX compliance was meeting part one, providing proportionate 
opportunities for both sexes, often by cutting male opportunities.  Perhaps as a 
result, the amount of litigation again spiked for the rest of the 1990s as thirty-
seven cases were decided from 1997 to 1999,169 and men continued to sue 
when their sports were eliminated.170 
 
162. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 172 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, Brown Univ. v. 
Cohen, 520 U.S. 1186 (1997). 
163. Id. at 173.  
164. Id. at 167. 
165. Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 1001. 
166. Clarification, supra note 145.  The Clarification provided that “[t]he first part of the test—
substantial proportionality—focuses on the participation rates of men and women at an institution and 
affords an institution a ‘safe harbor’ for establishing that it provides nondiscriminatory participation 
opportunities.”  Id. 
167. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 897–98 (1st Cir. 1993). 
168. Cohen, 101 F.3d at 188. 
169. Anderson & Osborne, supra note 14, at 150. 
170. See, e.g., Neal v. Bd. of Trs., 198 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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20. OCR GUIDANCE #5: SEXUAL HARASSMENT (1997) 
By the mid-1990s, much of the litigation surrounding Title IX in athletics 
had focused on the elimination of teams and the three-part test.  However, by 
the end of the 1990s, people began to realize that sexual harassment within 
educational programs was also a serious problem.  The Franklin case 
established that a plaintiff could receive monetary damages for claims of 
sexual harassment in violation of Title IX, and courts frequently reviewed 
sexual harassment claims related to harassment by coaches,171 teachers,172 and 
fellow students.173 
In order to help clarify the application of Title IX to instances of sexual 
harassment, OCR published its first guide, “Sexual Harassment Guidance” 
(the “Guidance”) in 1997.174  This Guidance explains that “[s]exual 
harassment of students can be a form of discrimination prohibited by Title IX” 
and that schools must have policies and procedures in place that provide for “a 
prompt and equitable procedure for resolving sex discrimination 
complaints.”175  Schools are liable for instances of quid pro quo sexual 
harassment176 and may also be liable for hostile environment sexual 
harassment177 if the coach or other employee uses their apparent authority 
when they engage in harassing conduct.   
Schools may also be liable for student-on-student sexual harassment (i.e. 
peer-to-peer) if the school allowed a hostile environment to persist, knew or 
should have known about the harassment, and failed to take immediate and 
appropriate actions to correct the situation.178  Overall, in order to properly 
deal with instances of sexual harassment, the Guidance provides that schools 
must “establish grievance procedures, provide for prompt and equitable 
resolution of sex discrimination complaints, publicize the procedures and full 
sexual harassment policy, monitor employees to avoid vicarious liability, and, 
after notice of possible harassing conduct, a school must take immediate and 
 
171. See, e.g., Ericson v. Syracuse Univ., 35 F. Supp. 2d 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
172. See, e.g., Doe v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223 (5th Cir. 1997). 
173. See, e.g., R.L.R. v. Prague Pub. Sch. Dist. I-103, 838 F. Supp. 1526 (W.D. Okla. 1993). 
174. Norma Cantu, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, Sexual Harassment Guidance: 
Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 4000-01-P, OFFICE 
FOR CIV. RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. (Mar. 13, 1997), available at http://www.ed.gov/about 
/offices/list/ocr/docs/sexhar00.html [hereinafter Guidance]. 
175. Id. 
176. Where a coach grants or withholds benefits as a result of the athlete’s willingness or refusal 
to submit to the coach’s sexual demands.  Anderson & Osborne, supra note 14, at 148 n.179. 
177. Where the conduct is so severe that it creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive 
environment that interferes with the athlete’s ability to perform.  Id. 
178. Guidance, supra note 174. 
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appropriate steps.”179 
21. THE THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER TITLE IX (1998) 
By 1998, although OCR’s Guidance set a framework for a school’s 
responsibilities to protect students from sexual harassment, courts had not yet 
clarified what relief a plaintiff could receive in a sexual harassment case.  The 
Supreme Court would begin to set out the available relief in sexual harassment 
cases in 1998. 
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District was the first case to deal 
with a sexual harassment claim brought by a high school student.180  In 
Gebser, the student participated in a sexual relationship with one of her 
teachers.181  Although the relationship was hidden, eventually a police officer 
found the student and teacher having sex.182  The teacher was subsequently 
arrested and eventually fired.183  The school district had failed to implement a 
proper grievance procedure, as provided in the Guidance, but the court still 
would not support an award of damages for the plaintiff “unless an official of 
the school district who at a minimum has authority to institute corrective 
measures on the district’s behalf has actual notice of, and is deliberately 
indifferent to, the teacher’s misconduct.”184  Finding that the school district 
did not have this actual notice or act deliberately indifferent, the court affirmed 
the appellate court’s decision that the student could not recover damages for 
the teacher’s sexual harassment.185 
Although the student was unable to recover in this case, the Gebser 
decision confirmed that victims of sexual harassment could recover under 
Title IX if they could show that the school (or other educational institution 
involved) had actual notice of the harassment and was deliberately indifferent 
to the harassment.  The specific parameters of a school’s notice and 
indifference have been debated over the past thirteen years and continue to be 
clarified by the judiciary.  
22. OCR GUIDANCE #6: FINANCIAL AID (1998) 
One month after the Gebser decision, OCR provided further guidance for 
 
179. Anderson & Osborne, supra note 14, at 149. 
180. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998).   
181. Id. at 278. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 284. 
185. Id. at 292–93. 
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schools related to athletic scholarships.  The Regulations provide that 
educational programs must provide athletic scholarships “in proportion to the 
number of students of each sex participating in interscholastic or 
intercollegiate athletics.”186  The Policy Interpretation then provides that 
athletic scholarships provided must be “substantially proportionate” to the 
participation rates for men and women, although disparities may be allowed as 
a result of “legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors,” such as higher out-of-state 
tuition costs at public schools.187  In 1998, while in the process of 
investigating twenty-five complaints related to the provision of athletic 
scholarships, OCR provided a Dear Colleague Letter (the “July 1998 Letter”) 
expanding upon these requirements.188 
The July 1998 Letter noted that a “disparity” in the awarding of athletic 
scholarships “refers to the difference between the aggregate amount of money 
athletes of one sex received in one year, and the amount they would have 
received if their share of the entire annual budget for athletic scholarships had 
been awarded in proportion to their participation rates.”189  When OCR 
analyzes a school’s provision of scholarships, it will first adjust this disparity 
to account for any “legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons provided by the 
college.”190  The July 1998 Letter provides several examples of legitimate 
reasons for disparities in these numbers, including efforts by schools to 
increase participation opportunities in order to comply with part one of the 
three-part test.191  If a disparity is 1% or less for the entire athletic scholarship 
budget, “there will be a strong presumption that such a disparity is reasonable 
and based on legitimate and nondiscriminatory factors.”192  However, if there 
is an unexplained disparity of more than 1%, “there will be a strong 
presumption” that the school “is in violation of the ‘substantially 
 
186. 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c)(1). 
187. Policy Interpretation, supra note 57, ¶ 2. 
188. Dr. Mary Frances O’Shea, National Coordinator for Title IX Athletics, Dear Colleague 
Letter: Bowling Green State University, OFFICE FOR CIV. RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. (July 23, 
1998), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/bowlgrn.html [hereinafter July 
1998 Letter].  
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. Id.  See, e.g., Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 879 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D. Iowa 1995).  Members of 
eliminated men’s wrestling team argued that the school violated the financial assistance regulations 
because the cuts magnified the disparity in scholarship funding as female athletes were already 
receiving significantly more scholarship funds than male athletes.  Finding that the “safe harbor” in 
part one of the three part test “more comprehensively serves the remedial purposes of Title IX than 
does the scholarship test and therefore must prevail.”  Id. at 1006. 
192. July 1998 Letter, supra note 188. 
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proportionate’ requirement.”193  In the end, if a college does not meet this 1% 
threshold, the “burden should be on the college to provide legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reasons for the disproportionate allocation.”194  
Overall, although OCR will again conduct a case-by-case analysis “with 
due regard for the unique factual situation presented by each case” when 
reviewing an athletic program, this 1% threshold does not leave much room 
for flexibility.  This is clearly intentional, as “a college has direct control over 
its allocation of financial aid to men’s and women’s teams,” and so a lack of 
“substantial proportionality” could be clear evidence of a conscious decision 
by the school to provide an inequitable amount of scholarships to male and 
female student-athletes.195 
23. THE NCAA IS NOT SUBJECT TO TITLE IX (1999) 
The next year, the Supreme Court would review Title IX for the fourth 
time, in NCAA v. Smith.196  Renee Smith was an undergraduate at St. 
Bonaventure where she participated on the volleyball team in the 1991–1992 
and 1992–1993 seasons.197  She decided not to play in the 1993–1994 season 
and graduated from St. Bonaventure in two and a half years.198  She then 
decided to go to law school and enrolled at Hofstra University in 1994–1995 
and the University of Pittsburgh in 1995–1996 because St. Bonaventure did 
not have a law school.199  While in law school, she attempted to play 
volleyball, but was barred by the NCAA’s postbaccalaureate rule that does not 
allow student-athletes to participate in athletics after undergraduate graduation 
unless they participate at the school where they earned their undergraduate 
degree.200  Smith sued, arguing that the rule violated Title IX because the 
NCAA granted more waivers under the rule to men than to women.201  The 
district court found that Smith’s argument that the NCAA was subject to Title 
IX based on financial assistance received by member schools was “too far 
attenuated” to sustain a claim.202  On appeal, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, finding that the NCAA’s receipt of 
 
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
196. 525 U.S. 459 (1999). 
197. Id. at 463. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. at 464. 
202. Smith v. NCAA, 978 F. Supp. 213, 219 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
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dues from member schools made the NCAA a beneficiary of federal financial 
assistance and was enough to make it a recipient of federal funds subject to 
Title IX.203  The NCAA then appealed to the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court found that only those entities that directly or indirectly 
receive federal financial assistance are subject to Title IX.204  As there was no 
allegation that the NCAA member schools paid dues with the federal funds 
that they received, “[a]t most, the Association’s receipt of dues demonstrate[d] 
that it indirectly benefits from the federal assistance afforded its members.”205  
As a result, the NCAA was immune from suit under Title IX. 
It is important to note that although the NCAA is not amenable to lawsuits 
under Title IX, as an organization, it does a lot to promote and achieve gender 
equity.  Its “Principle of Gender Equity” actually promotes member school 
compliance with Title IX:  
2.3 THE PRINCIPLE OF GENDER EQUITY 
2.3.1 Compliance With Federal and State Legislation. It is the 
responsibility of each member institution to comply with 
federal and state laws regarding gender equity . . . . 
2.3.2 NCAA Legislation. The Association should not adopt 
legislation that would prevent member institutions from 
complying with applicable gender-equity laws, and should 
adopt legislation to enhance member institutions’ compliance 
with applicable gender-equity laws . . . . 
2.3.3 Gender Bias. The activities of the Association should be 
conducted in a manner free of gender bias.206  
The NCAA also maintains many resources on recent developments related to 
Title IX and gender equity law, and consistently promotes compliance 
throughout its membership.207 
24. THE FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER TITLE IX (1999) 
Three months after the Smith case, the Supreme Court again analyzed a 
 
203. Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 189 (3d Cir. 1998). 
204. Smith, 525 U.S. at 468. 
205. Id. 
206. 2010–11 NCAA DIVISION 1 MANUAL 4 (2010). 
207. See NCAA Gender Equity, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/portal/ncaahome?WCM_ 
GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/ncaa/NCAA/About+The+NCAA/Diversity+and+Inclusion/Gender+Equity+
and+Title+IX/homepage.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2011). 
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claim under Title IX in a case mirroring Gebser’s analysis of a Title IX sexual 
harassment claim, though this time applying that analysis to peer-to-peer 
sexual harassment.  In Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, a fifth-
grade student was subject to prolonged sexual harassment by a classmate.208  
The student complained to several teachers, but they did nothing to stop the 
harassment even though the plaintiff’s grades suffered and she contemplated 
suicide.209  The classmate’s behavior stopped only when he was arrested and 
pled guilty to sexual battery charges.210  Mirroring its decision in Gebser, and 
noting OCR’s Guidance, the Supreme Court held that the school could be 
liable “for [its] deliberate indifference to known acts of peer sexual 
harassment”211 when the harassment “is so severe, pervasive, and objectively 
offensive that it effectively bars the victim’s access to an educational 
opportunity or benefit.”212  Therefore, the Court found that the school could be 
liable for damages because the plaintiff’s allegations demonstrated that school 
officials acted with deliberate indifference to harassment that was “severe, 
pervasive, and objectively offensive,” and “had a concrete, negative effect on 
her . . . ability to receive an education.”213  
As a result of Gebser, Davis, and the Guidance, schools are now on notice 
that they can be liable for harassing conduct by their employees and students, 
and the schools must have proper procedures in place to deal with these 
situations when they become aware of them. 
25. GIRLS CAN PLAY FOOTBALL TOO (1999) 
The next interesting development in 1999 involved a collegiate female 
student-athlete who wanted to play football at Duke University.  In Mercer v. 
Duke University,214 Heather Sue Mercer was a star football player who won 
all-state honors as a kicker at Yorktown Heights High School in New York.  
She went to Duke University and tried out for the team, but she did not make 
it.215  Instead, she became a team manager and participated in conditioning 
drills and practice in 1994.216  In 1995, she participated in a scrimmage and 
 
208. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
209. Id. at 633–34. 
210. Id. at 634. 
211. Id. at 648. 
212. Id. at 633. 
213. Id. at 653–54. 
214. 190 F.3d 643 (4th Cir. 1999). 
215. Id. at 644. 
216. Id. 
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kicked the game-winning field goal, a moment that was aired on ESPN.217  
The head coach then told the media that she had made the team, although she 
subsequently did not participate in any games in 1995.218 
During this time, she alleged that she was subjected to various types of 
discrimination, such as not being allowed to attend summer football camp or 
to dress or sit on the sidelines for games and hearing numerous offensive 
comments from the head coach.219  Before the 1996 season, the coach 
removed her from the team.220  As a result, in September of 1997, she sued, 
claiming that the decision to exclude her was discriminatory because it was 
based on her gender.221  The trial court dismissed her claim, and she 
subsequently appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit.222 
The Fourth Circuit began its review, noting that the Title IX Regulations 
provide for separate teams based on sex.223  However, the court found that 
“[o]nce an institution has allowed a member of one sex to try out for a team 
operated by the institution for the other sex in a contact sport . . . the institution 
is subject to the general anti-discrimination provision of” the Regulations and 
cannot discriminate against that individual.224  On remand, a jury found that 
Duke had violated Title IX and “discriminated against Mercer on the basis of 
her gender” and awarded her “$1 in compensatory damages and $2 million in 
punitive damages.”225 
The university appealed, arguing that punitive damages should not be an 
available remedy for a claim of discrimination under Title IX.226  As noted 
earlier in this Article, Title IX is modeled after Title VI, and the Fourth Circuit 
found that because the Supreme Court has held such damages are not available 
under Title VI, it was compelled to conclude that “punitive damages are not 
available for private actions brought to enforce Title IX.”227  As a result, the 
court vacated the punitive damages award, and Mercer’s sole award was one 
 
217. Id. at 645. 
218. Id. 
219. Id. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. at 645–56. 
224. Id. at 648. 
225. Mercer v. Duke Univ., 181 F. Supp. 2d 525, 535 (M.D.N.C. 2001). 
226. Mercer v. Duke Univ., 50 Fed. Appx. 643 (4th Cir. 2002). 
227. Id. at 644. 
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dollar in compensatory damages.228 
As some scholars have noted, “[t]his decision may significantly weaken 
the benefit of litigating a Title IX claim” because, although a claimant like 
Mercer can win, the actual benefit of the litigation is minimal.229  Fighting a 
school in order to prove discrimination is costly and time consuming, 
especially if winning can result in such an insignificant damage award. 
26. WHAT IS A SPORT UNDER TITLE IX: PART ONE (2000) 
The 1996 Clarification provided that athletic opportunities “must be real, 
not illusory,” and such participants will only be athletes who are “receiving 
. . . institutionally-sponsored support,” “participating in organized practice 
sessions,” and “are listed on the eligibility or squad lists,” or are injured and 
“continue to receive financial aid on the basis of athletic ability.”230  Many 
schools still did not understand what particular activities could be classified as 
a sport for these athletes to participate in.  In the spring of 2000, in two letters 
to the Executive Director of the Minnesota State High School League, OCR 
attempted to provide some details to answer this question. 
The first, sent on April 11, 2000 (the “April 2000 Letter”), began by 
noting that “OCR does not rely on a specific definition of sport. Nor does 
OCR rely solely on a claim by an institution that the activity in question is a 
sport.”231  Instead, similar to the approach noted in the Policy Interpretation, 
when analyzing whether an activity qualifies as a sport for Title IX purposes, 
OCR will “assess each activity on a case-by-case basis.”232  The April 2000 
Letter then provides different types of inquiries that OCR will undertake in 
determining whether something is a sport, including, but not limited to, 
“whether the primary purpose of the activity is athletic competition and not the 
support or promotion of other athletes,” and “whether organizations 
knowledgeable about the activity agree that it should be recognized as an 
athletic sport.”233   
The Regulations specifically apply Title IX’s prohibition against sex 
discrimination to “interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural 
 
228. Id. 
229. Anderson & Osborne, supra note 14, at 159. 
230. Clarification, supra note 145. 
231. Letter from Dr. Mary Frances O’Shea, Nat’l Coordinator for Title IX Athletics, Office for 
Civ. Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to David V. Stead, Exec. Dir., Minn. State High Sch. League (Apr. 
11, 2000) [hereinafter April 2000 Letter]. 
232. Id. 
233. Id. at 2. 
 FILENAME  \* MERGEFORMAT TITLE IX AT FORTY ARTICLE DRAFT #4.92611 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2012  3:19 PM 
364 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 22:2	
athletics,”234 as does the Policy Interpretation.235  However, perhaps following 
up on the 1996 Clarification’s criteria used to determine who is an athletic 
participant, the April 2000 Letter noted that: 
[I]n order for the athletes who engage in the activity to be 
considered participants for purposes of Title IX analysis of 
intercollegiate or interscholastic benefits and opportunities, 
they must be engaging in sports at the intercollegiate or 
interscholastic level of competition.  Thus, club and 
intramural participants would be excluded from such a Title 
IX analysis.236 
This exclusion might explain why most cases do not discuss intramural or club 
sports when analyzing whether a school complies with Title IX. 
In addition, this letter reiterates the Memorandum237 and makes clear that 
“there is a presumption by OCR that drill teams, cheerleading, and other like 
activities are extracurricular activities not considered sports or part of an 
institution’s athletic program within the meaning of the Title IX 
regulations.”238 
A little more than a month later, on May 24, 2000, OCR sent another letter 
(the “May 2000 Letter”) to the Minnesota State High School League.239  This 
May 2000 Letter responded to a request for a further clarification of the 
activities presumed not to be sports in the April 2000 Letter.  Although the 
May 2000 Letter makes clear that OCR does not have definitions of these 
activities, it then provides some clarification in that “the term cheerleading in 
this context includes both competitive and sideline cheer” and “other like 
activities would include all extracurricular activities similar to drill teams and 
cheerleading, such as danceline, skateline, and pep squads.”240  OCR also 
recognized that, in any past situation where it has been asked to evaluate these 
types of activities, it “did not recognize as a sport any of the identified 
activities.”241  Eight years later, OCR would provide further criteria for 
 
234. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41. 
235. Policy Interpretation, supra note 57. 
236. April 2000 Letter, supra note 231 at 2 n. 2. 
237. Memorandum, supra note 36, at 3. 
238. April 2000 Letter, supra note 231, at 3. 
239.  Letter from Dr. Mary Frances O’Shea, Nat’l Coordinator for Title IX Athletics, Office for 
Civ. Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to David V. Stead, Exec. Dir., Minn. State High Sch. League (May 
24, 2000) [hereinafter May 2000 Letter]. 
240. Id. 
241. Id. 
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assessing whether an activity is a sport. 
27. OCR GUIDANCE #7: REVISED GUIDANCE (2001) 
In response to the Supreme Court’s Gebser and Davis decisions, in 
January of 2001, OCR issued revised guidance (the “Revised Guidance”).242  
In many ways, simply reiterating what was already contained in the Guidance, 
the Revised Guidance was intended to continue to “provide the principles that 
a school should use to recognize and effectively respond to sexual harassment 
of students in its program as a condition of receiving Federal financial 
assistance.”243  In addition, while the Supreme Court established that 
claimants can have claims under Title IX for teacher-to-student or peer-to-peer 
sexual harassment, the Revised Guidance made clear that in order to comply 
with Title IX, “[s]trong policies and effective grievance procedures are 
essential to let students and employees know that sexual harassment will not 
be tolerated and to ensure that they know how to report it.”244 
Although courts have found that the 1997 and 2001 sexual harassment 
guidance documents are important because they were published “to guide 
funding recipients in fulfilling their Title IX obligations,”245 to date, they have 
not given them the same deference that has been provided to the various Title 
IX clarifications.  As one court noted, “[t]he DOE’s Sexual Harassment 
Guidance provides just that: guidance.  It is not binding on this Court, but 
rather a resource on the DOE’s position.  It sets out the ‘compliance standards 
that [the DOE] applies in investigations and administrative enforcement of 
Title IX.”246 
28. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT REPORTS ON TITLE IX’S IMPACT (2001) 
In 1994, the EADA was passed, requiring schools to report information to 
the Department of Education, information that would then be available to the 
public.247  The 1998 Amendments to the Higher Education Act of 1965 
required additional reporting.248  Under these amendments, the Government 
 
242. OFFICE FOR CIV. RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD 
PARTIES (Jan. 2001), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.pdf. 
243. Id. at ii. 
244. Id. at iii. 
245. Herndon v. Coll. of Mainland, 2009 WL 367500, *19 n.12 (S.D. Tex. 2009). 
246. A.J. v. Victor Elementary Sch. Dist., 2011 WL 1005009, *6 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 2011). 
247. 20 U.S.C. § 1092. 
248. 1998 Amendments to the Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 105-244, § 805 
(“Study Of Opportunities For Participation In Athletics Programs”).  The Amendment was repealed in 
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Accountability Office was required to “conduct a study of the opportunities for 
participation in intercollegiate athletics,”249 focusing on many items, 
including:  
[T]he extent to which the number of . . . (A) secondary school 
athletic teams has increased or decreased in the 20 years 
preceding 1998 (in aggregate terms); and (B) intercollegiate 
athletic teams has increased or decreased in the 20 years 
preceding 1998 (in aggregate terms) at 2-year and 4-year 
institutions of higher education.250 
The first report analyzing these criteria was released in March of 2001.  This 
report, “Intercollegiate Athletes: Four-Year Colleges’ Experiences Adding and 
Discontinuing Teams,” was based on questionnaires sent to NCAA and 
National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA) schools.251  The 
findings that have proven to be most controversial relate to the report’s 
analysis of schools that had cut teams.  It found that from 1992–1993 until 
1999–2000, 386 teams had been cut for men, while 150 had been cut for 
women.252  In direct opposition to those arguing that Title IX has forced 
schools to cut men’s opportunities, the report found that 72% of the schools 
added women’s teams without simultaneously cutting men’s teams.253  These 
schools “used a variety of strategies to do so, including obtaining funding from 
nonschool sources and finding ways to contain costs.”254  This report, and in 
particular this finding, has been contested repeatedly by Title IX detractors in 
litigation over the elimination of male sports opportunities.255 
 
2008 by Pub. L. No. 110-315, Title IX, Part C, § 931(1), 122 Stat. 3456, (Aug. 14, 2008) (effective on 
enactment).  Regardless, the several reports were published during the ten years that the Act was in 
place. 
249. § 805 (a)(1). 
250. Id. 
251. This report was produced by the U.S. General Accounting Office, which has since been 
renamed the U.S. Government Accountability office; either may be referred to as the GAO.  U.S. 
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NO. 01-297, INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: FOUR-YEAR 
COLLEGES’ EXPERIENCES ADDING AND DISCONTINUING TEAMS (Mar. 2001), available at http:// 
www.gao.gov/new.items/d01297.pdf. 
252. Id. at 14. 
253. Id. 
254. Id. at 25. 
255. See, e.g., Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 942 (D.D.C. 
2003). 
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29. OCR GUIDANCE #8: FURTHER CLARIFICATION (2003) 
On the thirtieth anniversary of Title IX’s enactment, the Secretary of 
Education created a Commission on Opportunity in Athletics (the 
“Commission”) to study Title IX.  The purpose of the Commission was to 
“collect information, analyze issues, and obtain broad public input directed at 
improving the application of current federal standards for measuring equal 
opportunity for men and women and boys and girls to participate in athletics 
under Title IX.”256  The Commission was asked to study several questions, 
including: 
  Are Title IX standards for assessing equal opportunity in 
athletics working to promote opportunities for male and 
female athletes? 
  Is there adequate Title IX guidance that enables colleges 
and school districts to know what is expected of them and 
to plan for an athletic program that effectively meets the 
needs and interests of their students? 
  Is further guidance or other steps needed at the junior and 
senior high school levels, where the availability or 
absence of opportunities will critically affect the 
prospective interests and abilities of student-athletes when 
they reach college age?257 
 The Commission issued a final report on February 28, 2003, including 
twenty-three recommendations, of which fifteen were unanimously approved 
(the “Commission Report”).258  Given the history of Title IX and the many 
different forms of guidance provided by OCR, one of the more interesting 
recommendations was Recommendation #3: “[t]he Department of Education’s 
Office for Civil Rights should provide clear, consistent and understandable 
written guidelines for implementation of Title IX and make every effort to 
ensure that the guidelines are understood, through a national education 
effort.”259  With all of the guidance that OCR had already put forth during the 
first thirty years after the enactment of Title IX, it was perhaps surprising that 
the Commission would call for even more.  Regardless, in a few months, this 
 
256. THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION’S COMMISSION ON OPPORTUNITY IN ATHLETICS, “OPEN 
TO ALL” TITLE IX AT THIRTY 2 (Feb. 28, 2003), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/bdscomm 
/list/athletics/title9report.pdf [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT]. 
257. Id. at 3. 
258. Id. at 4. 
259. Id. at 33. 
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call would be answered. 
Another interesting recommendation was Recommendation #5: “[t]he 
Office for Civil Rights should make clear that cutting teams in order to 
demonstrate compliance with Title IX is a disfavored practice.”260  The 
Commission noted that “educational institutions should pursue all other 
alternatives before cutting or capping any team when Title IX compliance is a 
factor in that decision.”261  It is interesting that the Commission felt the need 
to make this recommendation.  The 2001 Government AccountabilityOffice 
(GAO) report found that the majority of schools were able to add teams 
without cutting opportunities.262  The 1996 Clarification had also already 
stated that “nothing . . . requires that an institution cap or eliminate 
participation opportunities,” instead “Title IX provides institutions with 
flexibility and choice regarding how they will provide nondiscriminatory 
participation opportunities.”263 
Perhaps most controversially, Recommendation #18 provided that:  
The Office for Civil Rights should allow institutions to 
conduct interest surveys on a regular basis as a way of (1) 
demonstrating compliance with the three-part test, (2) 
allowing schools to accurately predict and reflect men’s and 
women’s interest in athletics over time, and (3) stimulating 
student interest in varsity sports.  The Office should specify 
the criteria necessary for conducting such a survey in a way 
that is clear and understandable.264 
Although OCR would directly respond to this recommendation in 2005, by 
2010, it would disavow that response altogether.   
Virtually every aspect of the Commission process, from its membership, 
how it gathered information, the makeup of the town meetings it called, and 
even its charge, was widely criticized.265  In addition, a minority report was 
simultaneously issued by two Commission members out of their concern that 
minority views were not adequately expressed in the final report.266 
 
260. Id. at 34. 
261. Id. 
262. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 251, at 14. 
263. Clarification, supra note 145. 
264. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 256, at 38 (emphasis omitted). 
265. Barbara Osborne, Title IX in the 21st Century, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 141, 153–56 
(2003). 
266. DONNA DE VARONA & JULIE FOUDY, MINORITY VIEWS ON THE REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSION ON OPPORTUNITY IN ATHLETICS 19 (Feb. 2003), available at http://66.40.5.5/Content/ 
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Soon after the Commission Report was issued, OCR issued further 
clarification (the “Further Clarification”) “in order to strengthen Title IX’s 
promise of non-discrimination in the athletic programs of our nation’s 
schools.”267  The Further Clarification notes that because the 1996 
Clarification referred to the first part (proportionality) as a “safe harbor,” 
institutions came “to believe, erroneously, that they must take measures to 
ensure strict proportionality between the sexes.”268  However, the Further 
Clarification made clear that “each of the three prongs of the test is an equally 
sufficient means of complying with Title IX, and no one prong is favored.”269  
Following the recommendation of the Commission, the Further Clarification 
also stated that “nothing in Title IX requires the cutting or reduction of teams 
in order to demonstrate compliance with Title IX, and . . . the elimination of 
teams is a disfavored practice” because “it is contrary to the spirit of Title IX 
for the government to require or encourage an institution to eliminate athletic 
teams.”270  Finally, OCR promised to conduct an educational campaign to 
provide further specific guidance to schools as to how they can best comply 
with Title IX.271 
30. ELIMINATION OF OPPORTUNITIES: PART THREE (2004)  
The Kelley decision in 1995 demonstrated that when universities cut male 
opportunities in order to come into compliance with Title IX, they do not 
violate Title IX.  The 1996 and 2003 clarifications, while not encouraging 
cutting male opportunities, made clear that under part one of the three-part 
test, such cuts were a legal method for schools to achieve Title IX compliance. 
Still, members of eliminated male sports did not give up, and, in the 2000s, 
they stopped suing schools over this practice (perhaps because they did not 
win those lawsuits) and started to sue the federal government itself. 
One group to bring this type of claim against the federal government was 
the National Wrestling Coaches Association, a membership organization that 
represents collegiate male wrestlers, coaches, athletes, and alumni.272  In 
 
Articles/Issues/Title-IX/M/Minority-Views-on-the-Report-of-the-Commission-on-Opportunity-in-
Athletics.aspx. 
267. Gerald Reynolds, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, Further Clarification of 
Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance Regarding Title IX Compliance, OFFICE FOR CIV. RIGHTS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (July 11, 2003), available at http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr 
/title9guidanceFinal.html.  
268. Id. 
269. Id. 
270. Id. 
271. Id. 
272. Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 366 F.3d 930 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1104 
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National Wresting Coaches Association v. Department of Education, the 
Association sued the Department, claiming that  
the enforcement policy embodied in the 1979 Policy 
Interpretation and the 1996 Clarification  i.e., the Three-
Part Test  violates the equal protection component of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and exceeds the 
Department’s statutory authority by requiring the very same 
intentional discrimination that Title IX prohibits.273   
The district court quickly found that: 
[I]t is clear that appellants have no standing to pursue this 
challenge, because they have not demonstrated that their 
alleged injuries will be redressed by the requested relief.  The 
direct causes of appellants’ asserted injuries  loss of 
collegiate-level wrestling opportunities for male student-
athletes  are the independent decisions of educational 
institutions that choose to eliminate or reduce the size of 
men’s wrestling teams. Appellants offer nothing but 
speculation to substantiate their claim that a favorable 
decision from this court will redress their injuries by altering 
these schools’ independent decisions. Absent a showing of 
redressability, appellants have no standing to challenge the 
Department’s enforcement policies, and we have no 
jurisdiction to consider their claims.274 
The plaintiffs also relied on the 2001 GAO report discussed above, and 
specifically its finding that 519 men’s teams were eliminated from 1981–1982 
to 1998–1999.275  Noting that the report found that schools actually added 
more teams (555) than they eliminated and that the report was “utterly 
inconclusive as to whether the Three-Part Test caused the elimination of any 
men’s athletic teams,” the court found that the report also did not support the 
plaintiff’s claims.276 
Finally, referring to the Cannon case, the court also found that “the 
 
(2005). 
273. Id. at 936. 
274. Id. at 936–37. 
275. Id. at 942.   
276. Id. at 943. 
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availability of a private cause of action directly against universities that 
discriminate in violation of Title IX constitutes an adequate remedy that bars 
[the] appellants’ case.”277  Therefore, the plaintiffs should have sued the 
schools making the decisions to cut the teams.  Although, of course, the Kelley 
decision demonstrates that there is not much likelihood that they would have 
won those lawsuits either.278 
Despite the fact that members of eliminated male teams have repeatedly 
lost lawsuits against schools and the federal government, these lawsuits have 
continued.279  In addition, advocacy groups have petitioned the Department to 
rescind the three-part test itself.  In 2003, the College Sports Council280 
petitioned the Department, asking it to do just that.281 Following its Further 
Clarification, and referring to the district court in the National Wrestling 
Coaches Association litigation, OCR denied the request noting that “‘[t]he 
Three-Part Test has consistently been found to be worthy of . . . deference, as 
well as enforcement, based on findings that it does not violate the statute or 
regulations, exceed the agency’s statutory authority, or offend constitutional 
principles . . . .’”282  
The second request on behalf of the College Sports Council came from the 
Pacific Legal Foundation (the “Foundation”) in 2007, asking the Department 
again to repeal the three-part test, specifically as it applies to high school 
athletics. 283  The Department denied the request, asserting that “[n]umerous 
federal courts have held that the 1979 Policy Interpretation and the Three-Part 
Test are entitled to substantial deference,” and that “every federal court that 
 
277. Id. at 945. 
278. Kelley, 35 F.3d at 270. 
279. See e.g., Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 504 F. Supp. 2d 88 (D.C. Va. 2007), 
aff’d, 639 F.3d 91 (4th Cir. 2011). 
280. According to its website, the Council is a “national coalition of coaches, athletes, parents, 
and fans who are devoted to preserving and promoting the student athlete experience.”  About Us, 
COLL. SPORTS COUNCIL, http://www.savingsports.org/about/ (last visited Aug. 12, 2011).  The 
National Wrestling Coaches Association is part of this group, and the Council was also part of 
parallel litigation that was also dismissed.  See Coll. Sports Council v. Dep’t of Educ., 357 F. Supp. 
2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005). 
281. Letter from Rod Paige, Sec’y of Educ., to Eric Pearson, Chairman, College Sports Council 
(July 28, 2003). 
282. Id. at 2 (citing Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ., 263 F. Supp. 2d 82, 96 
(D.D.C. 2003)). 
283. Steven Geoffrey Gieseler, Pac. Legal Found., Petition to Repeal, Amend, and Clarify Rules 
Applying Title IX to High School Athletics (June 19, 2007), available at 
www.pacificlegal.org/document.doc?id=559.  The Pacific Legal Foundation is a public interest legal 
organization that fights for limited government, property rights, individual rights, and a balanced 
approach to environmental protection.  About PLF, PAC. LEGAL FOUND., http://www.pacificlegal.org 
/page.aspx?pid=262 (last visited Aug. 12, 2011). 
 FILENAME  \* MERGEFORMAT TITLE IX AT FORTY ARTICLE DRAFT #4.92611 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2012  3:19 PM 
372 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 22:2	
has considered an equal protection challenge to the Three-Part Test has upheld 
its constitutionality.” 284 
The Foundation again petitioned the Department on February 8, 2011.285  
In response to several administrative complaints filed by the National 
Women’s Law Center, claiming that twelve school districts around the country 
were not providing equal athletic opportunities to girls,286 the Foundation 
asked the Department again to find that the three-part test does not apply to 
high school athletics.287   
In July of 2011, the Foundation, as part of the American Sports Council, 
followed its February letter with a complaint against the Department.288  The 
complaint focused on judicial review of the Department’s 2008 letter denying 
the Foundation’s request to revisit the three-part test’s application to high 
school athletics and asked the court to enjoin the Department from applying 
the three-part test to high school athletics in the future.289   
Although both the government agency responsible for enforcing Title IX 
and the courts have been consistent and clear in allowing cuts to male 
opportunities in order to comply with part one of the three-part test, it remains 
to be seen whether this type of litigation will stop.  Given that many of these 
courts have also recognized the value of athletic participation and its value as a 
part of the educational process, it is not surprising that these athletes who are 
being denied an opportunity to participate would seek some way to get their 
opportunity back.  In addition, if courts ever pick up the Minnesota District 
Court's reasoning in Cobb v. U.S. Department of Education,290 it is possible 
that these types of claims will be revisited. 
 
284. Letter from Margaret Spellings, Sec’y of Educ. to Steven Geoffrey Gieseler, Pac. Legal 
Found. (Mar. 27, 2008), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/title-ix-2008-
0327.pdf. 
285. Letter from Joshua Thompson, Pac. Legal Found., to Office for Civ. Rights, U.S. Dep’t of 
Educ. (Feb. 1, 2011), available at http://www.pacificlegal.org/page.aspx?pid=1477.   
286. Center Files Title IX Complaints Against 12 School Districts, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR. 
(Nov. 10, 2010), http://www.nwlc.org/press-release/center-files-title-ix-complaints-against-12-school-
districts. 
287. Thompson, supra note 285.  This position is especially interesting, as the Policy 
Interpretation, although focused on intercollegiate athletics, specifically states that “its general 
principles will often apply to club, intramural, and interscholastic athletic programs, which are also 
covered by regulation.  Accordingly, the Policy Interpretation may be used for guidance by the 
administrators of such programs when appropriate.”  Policy Interpretation, supra note 57, § III.  To 
date, the Department has not responded to this letter. 
288. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Am. Sports Council v. Dep’t of Educ., No. 
2011cv01347, available at http://www.pacificlegal.org/page.aspx?pid=1628.   
289. Id. at *5, *12. 
290. Cobb v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. for Civil Rights, 487 F. Supp. 2d 1049 (D. Minn. 2007).  See 
infra part 34. 
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31. VIOLATIONS OF TITLE IX: SCHEDULING ATHLETIC CONTESTS (2004) 
Although compliance with the three-part test has often been the focus of 
Title IX litigation, other areas started to see increased litigation in the past 
decade.  Apart from financial assistance and accommodation of interests and 
abilities, these areas focus on the analysis of the second through tenth factors 
from the Regulations.291  One area that has been particularly scrutinized at the 
high school level is “[s]cheduling of games and practice time.”292 
One of the most interesting cases dealing with scheduling focused on the 
scheduling practices of the New York State Public High School Athletic 
Association.293  In McCormick v. School District of Mamaroneck, 741 
member schools offered girls soccer in the fall, and the regional and state 
championships were at the end of the fall season.294  Boys soccer was 
scheduled in the fall at every school.295  The plaintiffs were outstanding 
female soccer players whose schools chose to play soccer in the spring.296  
They alleged two reasons for why they should be allowed to play soccer in the 
fall season: (1) so they could play in the championships and (2) because 
colleges typically recruit athletes for college scholarships in the fall.297  They 
sued, alleging that the scheduling violated Title IX.  The district court agreed 
and ordered the school districts involved to create a plan to offer soccer to 
both genders in the same season.298  The school districts then appealed to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 
In analyzing the scheduling claim, the court initially made it clear that it 
had to defer to the Regulations.299  The court then pointed to the language in 
the Regulations specifically dealing with “[s]cheduling of games and practice 
time.”300  The court then moved to the Policy Interpretation’s factors for 
assessing scheduling, focusing on “[t]he opportunities to engage in available 
pre-season and post-season competition.”301  Analyzing this factor, the court 
noted that a “disparity in one program component (i.e., scheduling of games 
and practice time) can alone constitute a Title IX violation if it is substantial 
 
291. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c). 
292. § 106.41(c)(3). 
293. McCormick, 370 F.3d 275.  
294. Id. at 279–80. 
295. Id. 
296. Id. at 280–81. 
297. Id. at 280–82. 
298. Id. at 283. 
299. Id. at 288. 
300. Id. at 289 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(3)). 
301. Id. (citing Policy Interpretation, supra note 57, § VII(B)(3)(b)(5)). 
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enough in and of itself to deny equality of athletic opportunity to students of 
one sex at a school.”302  The court then held “that the fact that boys have a 
chance to compete at the Regional and State Championships for soccer, and 
girls are denied this opportunity, constitutes a disparity that is substantial 
enough to deny equality of athletic opportunity to girls.”303 
32. OCR GUIDANCE #9: ADDITIONAL CLARIFICATION (2005) 
Although subsequently withdrawn by the “Intercollegiate 
Clarification,”304 the 2005 additional clarification (the “Additional 
Clarification”) still must be mentioned, as it was a direct response to the 
Commission Report, and it was another attempt by OCR to provide further 
guidance for schools as they attempted to comply with the three-part test.  It 
also is one of the only documents that attempted to provide specific guidance 
relative to part three of the test, effective accommodation of the interests and 
abilities of the underrepresented sex. 
Released in March 2005, the Additional Clarification pointed out that, 
although the focus of the Commission and often the focus of critics of Title IX 
is on part one and the elimination of opportunities, of 130 institutions that 
OCR investigated from 1992 to 2002, two-thirds complied with part three of 
the test.305  Controversial to some, the Additional Clarification also specified 
that under part three of the three-part test, an institution may provide 
proportionally fewer athletic participation opportunities to one sex as 
compared to its enrollment rate, if the interests and abilities of the enrolled and 
admitted students of the underrepresented sex are being fully and effectively 
accommodated by the institution’s current varsity athletics.306 
In addition, it noted that if a school complies with part one by providing 
proportionate opportunities for each sex, “it is not required to accommodate 
the specific interests of all of its students of the underrepresented sex.”307  The 
Additional Clarification also provided a sample survey and a “User’s Guide” 
 
302. Id. at 293. 
303. Id. at 296. 
304. Russlynn Ali, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter: Intercollegiate 
Athletics Policy Clarification: The Three-Part Test – Part Three, OFFICE FOR CIV. RIGHTS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF EDUC. (Apr. 20, 2010), at 1 available at http://ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague 
-20100420.html [hereinafter Intercollegiate Clarification]. 
305. Additional Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics Policy: Three-Part Test — Part Three, 
OFFICE FOR CIV. RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., at 2 (Mar. 17, 2005), available at http://www. 
nacua.org/documents/AddnClarificationInterCollegiateAthleticsPolicy.pdf [hereinafter Additional 
Clarification]. 
306. Id. at 3. 
307. Id. at 4 n.7. 
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to assist schools in complying with the third part of the three-part test.308 
One of the most controversial parts of the Additional Clarification is that it 
provided that:  
[T]he burden of proof is on OCR (in the case of an OCR 
investigation or compliance review), or on students (in the 
case of a complaint filed with the institution under its Title IX 
grievance procedures), to show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the institution is not in compliance with part 
three.309 
In other words, as opposed to monitoring schools’ compliance with Title IX, 
“OCR investigates complaints of discrimination and may, at its discretion, 
conduct compliance reviews,” it does not “preapprove or review compliance 
with these standards by every institution.”310 
In addition, it allowed schools that used the survey to count nonresponses 
as lack of interest.311  Although controversial, the Additional Clarification also 
provided that schools may only count nonresponses as lack of interest “if all 
students have been given an easy opportunity to respond to the census, the 
purpose of the census has been made clear, and students have been informed 
that the school will take nonresponse as an indication of lack of interest.”312  
Moreover, “schools must administer the census in a manner that is designed to 
generate high response rates, . . . students must have an easy opportunity to 
respond to it”313 and “schools cannot use the failure to express interest during 
a census or survey to eliminate a current and viable intercollegiate team for the 
underrepresented sex.”314   
Regardless of these clarifications, many groups immediately criticized the 
Additional Clarification.  The NCAA’s Executive Committee even passed a 
resolution calling for OCR to rescind it because it was “inconsistent with the 
 
308. NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, 
USER’S GUIDE TO DEVELOPING STUDENT INTEREST SURVEYS UNDER TITLE IX (Mar. 2005) 
(appendix to Additional Clarification), available at http://www.nacua.org/documents/Addn 
ClarificationInterCollegiateAthleticsPolicy.pdf. 
309.  James F. Manning, Delegated the Authority of the Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, 
Dear Colleague Letter, OFFICE FOR CIV. RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., at iv (Mar. 17, 2005), 
available at http://www.nacua.org/documents/AddnClarificationInterCollegiateAthleticsPolicy.pdf. 
310. Id. at 1. 
311. Id. at 6. 
312. Id. 
313. Id. 
314. Id. at 7. 
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1996 Clarification and with basic principles of equity under Title IX,” and it 
“provide[d] the opportunity to evade the legal obligation to provide equal 
opportunity in sports and violate[d] the Department’s 2003 commitment to 
strongly enforce long-standing Title IX standards.”315  Five years later, the 
controversy would end when OCR withdrew the Additional Clarification.  
Regardless, as part of the historical record of the federal agency's 
interpretation of Title IX and its requirements, the Additional Clarification 
provides an interesting perspective on the three-part test. 
33. THE FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER TITLE IX (2005) 
By 2005, the Supreme Court had reviewed Title IX seven times316 and 
held that it provided four different causes of action for potential plaintiffs.317  
However, violations of Title IX are not often reported by the student-athletes 
who are victims of discrimination.  This makes sense because these athletes 
fear that their participation in sport, even if they are not receiving the 
appropriate comparable benefits as their male counterparts, will be harmed if 
they complain.  They may also be perfectly satisfied with what they are 
receiving and not realize that the school’s athletic department is not in 
compliance with Title IX.  As a result, other individuals, such as coaches, 
often report Title IX violations to OCR, putting their own livelihoods at stake 
due to threats of retaliation or termination by their employers. 
In Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, Roderick Jackson was a 
high school teacher and girls basketball coach.318  He claimed that his team 
was not given equal funding or access to athletic equipment or facilities.319  
The school administration and school board ignored his complaints, and 
Jackson began to receive negative performance evaluations and was removed 
from his coaching position.320  Jackson sued, claiming that the Birmingham 
 
315. NCAA News Release, In Honor Of Title IX Anniversary NCAA Urges Department Of 
Education To Rescind Additional Clarification Of Federal Law, NCAA PRESS RELEASE ARCHIVE 
(June 22, 2005), available at http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/PressArchive/2005/Announcements/In%2 
BHonor%2Bof%2BTitle%2BIX%2BAnniversary%2BNCAA%2BUrges%2BDepartment%2Bof%2B
Education%2Bto%2BRescind%2BAdditional%2BClarification%2Bof%2BFederal%2BLaw.html. 
316. Cannon, 441 U.S. 677; N. Haven Bd. of Educ., 456 U.S. 512; Grove City Coll., 465 U.S. 
555; Franklin, 503 U.S. 60; Gebser, 524 U.S. 274; Smith, 525 U.S. 459; Davis, 526 U.S. 629. 
317. Cannon, 441 U.S. 677 (an implied private cause of action for violations of Title IX); 
Franklin, 503 U.S. 60 (a private cause of action for money damages for intentional violations of Title 
IX); Gebser, 524 U.S. 274 (a private cause of action for a teacher’s sexual harassment of a student);  
Davis, 526 U.S. 629 (a private cause of action for student-on-student (peer-to-peer) sexual 
harassment). 
318. 544 U.S. 167 (2005). 
319. Id. at 171. 
320. Id. at 171–72. 
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Board of Education (“Board”) and school violated Title IX by retaliating 
against him for complaining about the unequal treatment that the members of 
his girls basketball team were receiving.321  Finding that Title IX does not 
provide a cause of action related to retaliation, the district court dismissed his 
claim.322  The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit then 
affirmed, and Jackson appealed to the Supreme Court.323 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari because it recognized the conflict 
among the circuits as to whether there is a private cause of action for 
retaliation under Title IX.324  On March 29, 2005, the Supreme Court held 
retaliation against someone like Jackson, who complained about violations of 
Title IX, is another form of intentional discrimination in violation of Title 
IX.325  The Court explained that: 
[R]etaliation is, by definition, an intentional act.  It is a form 
of “discrimination” because the complainant is being 
subjected to differential treatment .  .  . .  Moreover, retaliation 
is discrimination “on the basis of sex” because it is an 
intentional response to the nature of the complaint: an 
allegation of sex discrimination. We conclude that when a 
funding recipient retaliates against a person because he 
complains of sex discrimination, this constitutes intentional 
“discrimination” “on the basis of sex,” in violation of Title 
IX.326  
The case was then remanded to the Eighth Circuit, which proceeded to remand 
back to the district court.327  Before the district court could rule on whether the 
school board did discriminate against Jackson, the parties entered into a 
settlement agreement.328  Under this agreement, the Board refused to admit 
any liability for its actions toward Jackson.329  However, Jackson received 
$10,825 in back pay, $2,750 in out-of-pocket expenses, and $36,425 for 
 
321. Id.at 172. 
322. Id. 
323. Id. 
324. Id. 
325. Id. at 174. 
326. Id. at 173–74 (emphasis in original). 
327. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 416 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2005). 
328. Settlement Agreement and Mutual General Release, by and between Roderick Jackson and 
the Birmingham Board of Education (Nov. 28, 2006), available at http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/ 
files/pdfs/13%20AU4901-Final%20Settlement%20Agreement.pdf. 
329. Id. First: Non-Admission of Liability, at 1. 
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mental anguish and emotional distress.330  Additionally, the Board agreed to 
remove any documentation from Jackson’s personal file that commented 
negatively on his job performance.331  The Board also confirmed Jackson’s 
recent hire as a coach at a new school.332   
On November 30, 2006, the parties entered into a “Consent Decree” under 
which the Board agreed “to take all steps necessary to ensure that the 
Birmingham school system is free from discrimination on the basis of sex in 
all of its schools and programs.”333  The Board also agreed to hire a Title IX 
coordinator and to institute new antidiscrimination policies and grievance 
procedures to handle complaints of sex discrimination.334 
Although those who report violations of Title IX now have a cause of 
action if the school or other educational institution retaliates against them, 
there is more to a retaliation claim than merely alleging negative treatment by 
the school.  As coaches have found, the standard for demonstrating retaliation 
in violation of Title IX is a difficult one to meet.335 
34. VIOLATIONS OF TITLE IX: ATHLETIC FACILITIES (2007) 
Another factor from the Regulations that has been the subject of 
increasing litigation at the high school level is number seven, “[p]rovision of 
locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities.”336  Under the Policy 
Interpretation, in order to assess compliance with this part of the Regulations, 
OCR and courts must look to the 
equivalence for men and women of: 
(1) Quality and availability of the facilities provided for 
practice and competitive events; 
(2) Exclusivity of use of facilities provided for practice and 
competitive events; 
(3) Availability of locker rooms; 
 
330. Id. Third: Consideration, (1), at 2.  Interestingly, under the Agreement, Jackson’s legal 
counsel received $340,000.00.  Id. at (2). 
331. Id. (4)(d), at 3. 
332. Id. (4), at 2. 
333. Consent Decree, Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., CV-01-BE-1866-S, 3 (D. Ala. 2006), 
available at http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/14%20Jackson%20Consent%20Decree.pdf. 
334. Settlement Agreement and Mutual General Release, supra note 328, at 2–4. 
335. See, e.g., Cummings v. Tex. S. Univ., 2011 WL 1750697 (S.D. Tex. 2011); McNally v. 
Univ. of Haw., 2011 WL 322533 (D. Haw. 2011). 
336. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(7). 
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(4) Quality of locker rooms; 
(5) Maintenance of practice and competitive facilities; and 
(6) Preparation of facilities for practice and competitive 
events.337 
Several cases in Florida have focused on comparable high school sports, i.e., 
baseball and softball, and found that it was a violation of Title IX for schools 
to provide better facilities to the boys baseball team than the girls softball 
team.338   
Other litigation in Minnesota has focused on claims by high school girls 
hockey players who alleged that the state high school athletic association’s 
administration of the girls hockey championships were not substantially equal 
to its administration of the boys hockey championships.  In Mason v. 
Minnesota State High School League, the girls championships were held in an 
arena and then a coliseum with seating for up to approximately 5000 fans.339  
The boys championships were held at an NHL hockey arena with seating for 
17,000 fans.340  In 2000, the girls initiated a complaint with OCR regarding the 
differences in size and quality of the locations.341  The 2002 girls tournament 
drew 15,551 fans, while the boys tournament drew close to 120,000 fans.342  
Due to these attendance differences, and the fact that the girls were now 
playing at a new college hockey arena (even though its capacity was only 2700 
– 3200), OCR approved the high school association’s administration of the 
championships.343  The girls sued, claiming that this setup violated Title IX, 
specifically the Regulations dealing with facilities.344 
The Minnesota district court focused on the Policy Interpretation and, 
specifically, the factors related to facilities.  It noted that “[a]lthough the OCR 
policy interpretation recognizes that crowd size may influence the allocation 
of resources to a particular team or event, it permits such differences only 
when it ‘does not limit the potential for women’s athletic events to rise in 
spectator appeal.’”345  In this case, the court found that “[t]he evidence 
 
337. Policy Interpretation, supra note 57, § VII(B)(3)(f). 
338. See e.g., Landow v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard Cnty., 132 F. Supp. 2d 958 (M. D. Fla. 2000); 
Daniels v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard Cnty., 995 F. Supp. 1394 (M. D. Fla. 1997). 
339. Mason v. Minn. State High Sch. League, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13865 (D. Minn. 2004). 
340. Id. at *5. 
341. Id. at *2–*3. 
342. Id. at *3. 
343. Id. at *4.   
344. Id. at *6–*7. 
345. Id. at *14.   
 FILENAME  \* MERGEFORMAT TITLE IX AT FORTY ARTICLE DRAFT #4.92611 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2012  3:19 PM 
380 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 22:2	
presented on this record could lead a fact-finder to conclude that the capacity 
of Ridder impermissibly restricts the growth of girls’ ice hockey.”346  
Dismissing the state association’s motion for summary judgment, the court 
then found that the locations selected for the championships might violate 
Title IX because there were genuine “questions as to whether the [l]eague 
treats the girls’ ice hockey team in a manner ‘substantially equal’ to that of the 
boys’ team.”347 
Although the initial litigation ended, in Cobb v. U.S. Department of 
Education for Civil Rights, the focus shifted to a lawsuit by fathers of the girls 
hockey players who sued the Department, claiming that OCR’s process in 
allowing the hockey championships to continue in the same locations was 
flawed and that OCR should have found that the setup violated Title IX.348  
The fathers’ claims were dismissed for lack of standing;349 however, the girls 
then intervened and continued the litigation.350  In reviewing the amended 
complaint, the court ignored the litigation by men from discontinued sports 
and advocacy groups351 and found for the first time that there should be a 
“private right of action against federal funding agencies . . . when the funding 
agency itself is accused of acting to violate Title IX and foster 
discrimination.”352  Therefore, the government’s motion to dismiss the girls’ 
Title IX claim was denied.353   
At this point it seemed that the Minnesota district court had developed a 
potential sixth cause of action under Title IX, a private cause of action to sue 
OCR claiming that its own actions violated Title IX.  In this case, the plaintiffs 
alleged the OCR did just that by approving the different locations for the girls 
and boys, locations that the court in Mason found were potentially inequitable 
in violation of Title IX.354  In 2007, the district court granted OCR’s motion to 
vacate the opinion355 without any discussion.  As a result, the Supreme Court 
has had no chance to review this issue. Thus, the court’s reasoning has not yet 
been followed.   
 
346. Id. at *15. 
347. Id. at *12. 
348. Cobb v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. for Civ. Rights, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39985 (D. Minn. 
2006). 
349. Id. at *24. 
350. Cobb, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 1051. 
351. See, e.g., Kelley, 35 F.3d 265 & Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 366 F.3d 930. 
352. Cobb, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 1054. 
353. Id. at 1055. 
354. Mason, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13865, at *12. 
355. Cobb v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97578 (D. Minn. 2007). 
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35. WHAT IS A SPORT UNDER TITLE IX: PART TWO (2008) 
As courts have struggled with analyzing schools’ attempts to comply with 
Title IX, they often must determine what types of sports actually can be 
counted for Title IX purposes.  In its letters to the Minnesota State High 
School League in 2000, OCR made clear that it “does not rely on a specific 
definition of a sport.”356  However, a 2008 Dear Colleague Letter (“September 
2008 Letter”) would provide further information “to help institutions 
determine which intercollegiate or interscholastic athletic activities can be 
counted for the purpose of Title IX compliance,” and, therefore, which 
activities qualify as sports under Title IX.357   
In this September 2008 Letter, OCR reiterated that it has no specific 
definition of sport, instead it will consider factors related to “an activity’s 
structure, administration, team preparation and competition . . . when 
determining whether an activity is a sport that can be counted as part of an 
institution’s intercollegiate or interscholastic athletics program for the purpose 
of determining compliance.”358  OCR also introduced another presumption 
that it will follow.  If a school is part of an athletic association or organization, 
such as the NCAA, and that organization has its own requirements that define 
its sanctioned sports that must be followed by members, “OCR will presume 
that such an institution’s established sports can be counted under Title IX.”359  
This presumption could then be rebutted with evidence that the particular 
member institution is not offering the activity in accordance with the other 
factors listed in this letter. 
The September 2008 Letter separates the factors used in its “case-by-case” 
assessment of whether an activity should be counted as a sport into factors 
related to program structure and administration and those related to team 
preparation and competition.  In general, an analysis of program structure and 
administration focuses on “whether the activity is structured and administered 
in a manner consistent with established intercollegiate or interscholastic 
varsity sports in the institution’s athletics program.”360  OCR’s analysis of 
team preparation and competition focuses on “whether the team prepares for 
and engages in competition in a manner consistent with established varsity 
 
356. April 2000 Letter, supra note 231, at 1. 
357. Stephanie Monroe, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter: Athletic 
Activities Counted for Title IX Compliance, OFFICE FOR CIV. RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Sept. 17, 
2008), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-20080917.html 
(emphasis in original). 
358. Id. 
359. Id. (emphasis in original). 
360. Id. 
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sports in the institution’s intercollegiate or interscholastic athletics 
program.”361  Each area includes specific factors that assist OCR in analyzing 
whether an activity should be counted as a sport for Title IX purposes. 
Although the September 2008 Letter provides detailed information that 
may be used to assess whether an activity is a sport, OCR also made clear that 
this letter is not the law and does not “confer any rights for or on any 
person.”362  In addition, a school cannot simply look to what other schools are 
doing or rely on past OCR reviews of schools or activities, as the September 
2008 Letter makes clear that “determinations based on these factors are fact-
specific,” and they “may vary depending on a school district or postsecondary 
institution’s athletics program, the nature of the particular activity, and the 
circumstances under which it is conducted.”363  Regardless of these 
qualifications, this September 2008 Letter, coupled with the April 2000 and 
May 2000 Letters,364 clarifications,365 Memorandum,366 and the Policy 
Interpretation,367 provides detailed information for athletic administrators 
attempting to evaluate what types of activities they must provide in order to 
achieve Title IX compliance. 
36. TITLE IX AND THE CONSTITUTION (2009) 
The Supreme Court’s most recent review of Title IX focused on the 
continuing issue of whether a Title IX claim precludes a plaintiff from 
simultaneously bringing a constitutional claim as well.  Fitzgerald v. 
Barnstable School Committee brought the issue of peer-to-peer sexual 
harassment of a grade school student on a school bus to the Supreme Court.368  
The student’s parents complained to the school, which offered several 
alternatives to deal with the harassment, none of which satisfied the parents, 
who then sued, claiming that the school violated their daughter’s rights under 
Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause.369  The United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit initially focused on the Title IX claim and found 
that the school district was not liable for the sexual harassment because:  
 
361. Id. 
362. Id. 
363. Id. 
364. April 2000 Letter, supra note 231; May 2000 Letter, supra note 239. 
365. Clarification, supra note 145. 
366. Memorandum, supra note 36. 
367. Policy Interpretation, supra note 57. 
368. 555 U.S. 246 (2009). 
369. Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 504 F.3d 165, 170 (1st Cir. 2007).  
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Title IX does not make an educational institution the insurer 
either of a student’s safety or of a parent’s peace of mind.  
Understandably, then, “deliberate indifference” requires more 
than a showing that the institution’s response to harassment 
was less than ideal.  In this context, the term requires a 
showing that the institution’s response was “clearly 
unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.”370 
In this case, although the parents did not agree with the school district’s plan 
to deal with the harassment, “no rational factfinder could supportably conclude 
that the [Barnstable] School Committee acted with deliberate indifference in 
this case.”371 
Turning to the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim, the court found quickly 
that “the remedial scheme of Title IX is sufficiently comprehensive to 
demonstrate Congress’s intention to preclude the prosecution of counterpart 
actions against state actors . . . under section 1983.”372  The plaintiffs appealed 
this part of the decision to the Supreme Court.373 
The Supreme Court focused its initial analysis on prior decisions where 
claimants attempted to assert claims under the Constitution and separate 
federal statutes and noted that, “[i]n determining whether a subsequent statute 
precludes the enforcement of a federal right under § 1983, we have placed 
primary emphasis on the nature and extent of that statute’s remedial 
scheme.”374  In cases where the Court held that the statute precluded 
constitutional claims, the federal statutes themselves required “plaintiffs to 
comply with particular procedures and/or to exhaust particular administrative 
remedies prior to filing suit.”375  Looking to Title IX, the Court noted that the 
only enforcement mechanism provided in the statute is the potential 
withdrawal of federal funding from schools that do not comply with the 
law.376  Added to the implied right of action found in Cannon, this 
enforcement is far less than the elaborate enforcement schemes provided in 
other federal statutes.377  Moreover, the Court noted that it had never held that 
an implied right, like that provided in Cannon to enforce Title IX, “had the 
 
370. Id. at 171. 
371. Id. at 175. 
372. Id. at 179. 
373. Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. 246. 
374. Id. at 253. 
375. Id. at 254. 
376. Id. at 255. 
377. Id. 
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effect of precluding suit under § 1983.”378   
The Court also found that the actual rights provided under Title IX and the 
Equal Protection Clause are very different.  Title IX reaches institutions and 
programs that receive federal funds, but it does not authorize claims “against 
school officials, teachers, and other individuals.”379  On the other hand, equal 
protection claims can be brought against “individuals as well as municipalities 
and certain other state entities.”380 
Overall, because it found that Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause 
provide “divergent coverage,” and that Title IX contains no “comprehensive 
remedial scheme,” the Supreme Court concluded that “Title IX was not meant 
to be an exclusive mechanism for addressing gender discrimination in schools, 
or a substitute for § 1983 suits as a means of enforcing constitutional 
rights,”381 and “suits based on the Equal Protection Clause remain available to 
plaintiffs alleging unconstitutional gender discrimination in schools.”382 
37. OCR GUIDANCE #10: INTERCOLLEGIATE CLARIFICATION (2010) 
On April 20, 2010, after determining that “the 2005 policy documents are 
inconsistent with the Department’s long-standing Title IX athletics policy and 
nondiscrimination requirements and do not provide appropriate clarity 
regarding nondiscriminatory assessment methods, including surveys,” and in 
order to provide educational institutions “with additional clarification on 
compliance with part three of the three-part test,”383 OCR withdrew its 
Additional Clarification and published its “Intercollegiate Athletics Policy 
Clarification” (the “Intercollegiate Clarification”).384 
Focusing on part three, this Intercollegiate Clarification makes clear that 
“an institution can satisfy Part Three if it can show that the underrepresented 
sex is not being denied opportunities, i.e., that the interests and abilities of the 
underrepresented sex are fully and effectively accommodated.”385  Reiterating 
the 1996 Clarification, to determine whether an institution complies with part 
three, OCR considers three questions: (1) “Is there unmet interest in a 
 
378. Id. at 256. 
379. Id. at 257. 
380. Id. 
381. Id. at 258. 
382. Id. 
383. Intercollegiate Athletics Policy: Three-Part Test ― Part Three, Question 1, OFFICE FOR 
CIV. RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Apr. 16, 2010), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/ 
title9-qa-20100420.html. 
384. Intercollegiate Clarification, supra note 304. 
385. Id. at 3–4. 
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particular sport?”; (2) “Is there sufficient ability to sustain a team in the 
sport?”; and (3) “Is there a reasonable expectation of competition for the 
team?”386  If a review of an institution provides that the answer to all three of 
these questions is ‘yes’, then OCR will find that the institution does not meet 
part three and is violating Title IX.387 
Although not specifically telling institutions that they cannot survey their 
student body to assess interest, OCR makes clear that a student’s failure to 
respond to a survey cannot be used “as evidence sufficient to justify the 
elimination of a current and viable intercollegiate team for the 
underrepresented sex” because if a school has recently eliminated a team, 
“OCR will find that there is sufficient interest, ability, and available 
competition to sustain an intercollegiate team in that sport” and the elimination 
of the team creates a presumption that the school is not complying with part 
three.388  
Beyond mentioning that an institution must “periodically” assess student 
interest, it gives no further specific guidance as to how often a survey must be 
conducted aside from recommending that institutions have “effective ongoing 
procedures for collecting, maintaining, and analyzing information on the 
interests and abilities of students of the underrepresented sex.”389  Instead, an 
institution must periodically asses interest and abilities “so that the institution 
can identify in a timely and responsive manner any developing interests and 
abilities of the underrepresented sex.”390  Additionally, regardless of the 
method used, OCR will “not accept an institution’s reliance on a survey alone, 
regardless of the response rate, to determine whether it is fully and effectively 
accommodating the interests and abilities of its underrepresented students.”391 
Still, the Intercollegiate Clarification does provide some guidance as to 
how an institution might survey its student body to assess interests and 
abilities under part three.  OCR reiterates that schools must survey full-time 
undergraduates and admitted students who are part of the underrepresented 
sex.392  Unlike the Additional Clarification, in the Intercollegiate Clarification, 
OCR makes clear that it “does not consider nonresponses to surveys as 
evidence of lack of interest or ability in athletics.”393  In addition, the 
 
386. Id. at 4. 
387. Id. 
388. Id. at 5. 
389. Id. at 7–8. 
390. Id. at 7. 
391. Id. at 8. 
392. Id. at 10–11. 
393. Id. at 12. 
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Intercollegiate Clarification provides significant guidance relative to the 
content of a survey, response rates, confidentiality, frequency, the indicators it 
will use to assess whether there is a sufficient number of interested and able 
students to sustain a team, and whether there is a reasonable expectation of 
competition for that team.394  Overall,  
[i]f the information or documentation compiled by the 
institution during the assessment process shows that there is 
sufficient interest and ability to support a new intercollegiate 
team and a reasonable expectation of intercollegiate 
competition in the institution’s normal competitive region for 
the team, the institution is under an obligation to create an 
intercollegiate team within a reasonable period of time in 
order to comply with Part Three.395 
38. WHAT IS A SPORT UNDER TITLE IX: PART THREE (2010) 
The April 2000, May 2000, and September 2008 Letters provided some 
guidance on what is considered to be a sport in order to be counted as part of a 
school’s athletic department for Title IX purposes.  A recent case dealing with 
cheerleading analyzed this issue in further detail.  Although dealing with a 
university’s failed attempt to use roster management to manipulate its numbers 
of athletic participants and to meet the requirements of the three-part test, in 
order to add to an understanding of what is a sport under Title IX, this case is 
most interesting for its analysis of competitive cheer.   
In Biediger v. Quinnipiac University, the university attempted to justify 
eliminating the women’s volleyball team by elevating its competitive cheer 
team to varsity status and counting those participants in its overall athletic 
participation numbers.396  Members of the women’s volleyball team sued, 
claiming that this plan would not put the university into compliance with Title 
IX and that it should not be able to eliminate their team.397  The district court’s 
initial decision granted the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, 
stopping the school from eliminating the volleyball team.398 
The court then analyzed whether competitive cheer should even be 
considered a sport for Title IX purposes.  It initially recognized the 
 
394. Id. at 9–12. 
395. Id. at 13. 
396. 616 F. Supp. 2d 277 (D. Conn. 2009). 
397. Id. at 278–79.  
398. Id. at 298. 
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presumptions provided in OCR’s April 2000 Letter and May 2000 Letter, a 
“presumption against treating competitive cheerleading as a sport,” and OCR’s 
2008 Letter, a presumption “in favor of treating NCAA-governed activities . . . 
as sports.”399  Both presumptions would not favor the university, as it could 
not count competitive cheer as a sport, and the NCAA does not recognize 
competitive cheer as a sport. 
The court then turned to the analysis provided in the September 2008 
Letter in order to determine whether competitive cheer at this university was 
structured in such a way as to override these presumptions.  The court first 
looked at the program’s structure and administration, finding that the “team’s 
operating budget, benefits and services, and coaching staff are administered by 
the athletics department in a manner consistent with the administration of 
Quinnipiac’s other varsity teams.”400  However, the team received no locker 
room space, did not take part in the NCAA’s catastrophic insurance program, 
and was not allowed to conduct any off-campus recruiting, “a significant 
difference in program structure and administration, as compared to other 
varsity teams.”401 
The court then moved to an analysis of the team’s preparation and 
competition.  It found that the team’s practice schedule seemed to be similar to 
that of other varsity teams, but that “there are major and, ultimately, 
dispositive distinctions between the competitive cheer regular and post-season 
schedules and the schedules for other varsity squads.”402  The national cheer 
association did not set a maximum number of competitions, rules for what 
kinds of teams its members could play against, or create a set scoring system 
for competitions.403  In addition, the postseason was unorganized and being “a 
competitive cheerleading team was not” even “a prerequisite” in order to 
compete.404   
The court did note that the team met OCR’s criteria under this factor that 
its “primary purpose be to compete athletically at the intercollegiate varsity 
level” because “[t]here is no doubt that the purpose of the competitive cheer 
team is to compete, and not to cheer others.”405  Regardless, after reviewing 
these factors, the court found that “at this point in time, the University’s 
 
399. Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 93 (D. Conn. 2010). 
400. Id. at 95. 
401. Id. at 96. 
402. Id. at 96–97. 
403. Id. at 97. 
404. Id. at 98. 
405. Id. at 99. 
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competitive cheer team cannot count as a sport under Title IX.”406 
This decision provides one of the most thorough judicial analyses of 
whether an activity should be considered a sport under Title IX.  Using the 
letters and other guidance provided by OCR, the court painstakingly reviewed 
the competitive cheer team before concluding that it should not be considered 
a sport.  And it left the door open for universities and athletic membership 
organizations to change the landscape in the future, as the court said:  
I have little doubt that at some point in the near future—once 
competitive cheer is better organized and defined, and surely 
in the event that the NCAA recognizes the activity as an 
emerging sport—competitive cheer will be acknowledged as a 
bona fide sporting activity by academic institutions, the 
public, and the law.407 
39. APPLICATION OF THE THREE-PART TEST: NOTICE AND ASSURANCE OF 
COMPLIANCE (2010) 
Although most Title IX cases analyzing equal opportunity in athletic 
programs deal with part one of the test, a recent case involving the University 
of California-Davis focused on the second part, showing a continuing history 
and practice of program expansion. 
In Mansourian v. Regents of the University of California, several female 
wrestlers chose to attend the university so that they could participate in its 
acclaimed wrestling program, which provided opportunities for women to 
wrestle with the men.408  In 2000–2001, the university eliminated all women 
from the team.409  The students protested and filed a complaint with OCR, and 
the university subsequently agreed to permit them to wrestle.410  However, in 
order to do so, they had to beat male wrestlers in their weight class under the 
men’s rules.  The women were unable to meet this requirement and, thus, did 
not make the team, subsequently losing their scholarships.411  They sued the 
school, claiming violations of Title IX and constitutional claims under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.412   
The district court dismissed their constitutional claim because it was 
 
406. Id.  
407. Id. at 101. 
408. Mansourian v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 602 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 2010).   
409. Id. at 962. 
410. Id. 
411. Id.  
412. Id. 
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subsumed under the Title IX claim.413  It then granted the university’s motion 
to dismiss because the students had not given it advance notice of filing their 
suit claiming violations of Title IX.414 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit first 
analyzed whether notice is required before bringing a claim that a school did 
not provide equal opportunities to women.  Looking to Franklin and Gebser, 
the court concluded that “[p]roof of actual notice is required only when the 
alleged Title IX violation consists of an institution’s deliberate indifference to 
acts that ‘do not involve official policy of the recipient entity.’”415  Therefore, 
“no notice requirement is applicable to Title IX claims that rest on an 
affirmative institutional decision.”416  Here, the university made the decision 
to cut the women from the team and to create a system where they could not 
meet the participation criteria.  When a university makes this type of “official 
decision,” a plaintiff need not provide it with actual notice before bringing a 
Title IX claim.417 
The court also pointed to a part of the Regulations rarely mentioned in 
prior litigation.  In addition to specifying that universities must provide equal 
opportunity in athletics, the Regulations also mandate that any entity receiving 
federal financial assistance must “certify, as a condition for receiving funds, 
that they are ‘tak[ing] whatever remedial action is necessary . . . to eliminate . . 
. discrimination.’”418  This requirement makes clear that schools “have an 
affirmative obligation to ensure compliance with at least one prong of the 
three-part effective accommodation test.”419 
The court then analyzed whether the university could show that it was in 
compliance with the second part of the three-part test and, in so doing, 
provided guidance on how this part of the test should be analyzed.  The second 
part requires institutions to show that they have a history and continuing 
practice of expanding programs for members of the underrepresented sex.420  
The Ninth Circuit determined that this called for separate inquiries into the 
institution’s “history” and “continuing practice” of providing opportunities for 
its female students.421   
 
413. Id. 
414. Id. at 963. 
415. Id. at 967. 
416. Id.  
417. Id. at 968. 
418. Id. (citing 34 C.F.R. § 106.4 (2010)). 
419. Id. 
420. Policy Interpretation, supra note 57, § VII(C)(5)(a)(2). 
421. Mansourian, 602 F.3d at 969. 
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Looking at the evidence presented, the court found that the university did 
not expand opportunities from 1974 until 1996, only expanding opportunities 
from 1996 until 2000, when it then eliminated the women’s opportunities to 
wrestle.422  This evidence showed that the university did not have a “history of 
program expansion for women and so did not satisfy Option Two through such 
a history.”423   
Examining the program expansion factor, the court determined that while 
the university added a women’s golf team, it did not add teams in several other 
sports, including rugby and field hockey, which would have provided more 
opportunities for women and where women had shown definite interest in 
participating in the particular sports.424  Therefore, although the university had 
added new opportunities for women, part two “requires evidence of 
continuous progress toward the mandate of gender equality,” and no evidence 
showed that the university made any continuous progress toward expanding 
opportunities for women.425   
Therefore, the court held that “[t]he record before us does not contain 
undisputed facts showing a history and continuing practice of program 
expansion that is responsive to women’s interests,” and the university could 
not assert compliance with Title IX under part two.426 
Finally, the plaintiffs also brought a § 1983 claim, asserting that the 
university’s conduct violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause.  
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Fitzgerald, the Ninth Circuit 
reversed the district court, finding that Title IX “does not bar § 1983 suits to 
enforce rights under the Equal Protection Clause.”427   
Although not a Supreme Court decision, the Mansourian case is important 
in providing some analysis of how a university might comply with part two of 
the three-part test and making clear that universities that receive federal 
funding are actually required to meet some part of the three-part test as a 
condition for receiving these funds.  The court also made clear that Title IX 
plaintiffs do not need to provide specific pre-litigation notice to a university 
when they claim that the university’s own policies and procedures violated 
Title IX. 
 
422. Id. at 970. 
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40. OCR GUIDANCE #11: SEXUAL HARASSMENT LETTER (2011) 
The most recent OCR guidance adding to the development of gender 
equity law over the first four decades after the enactment of Title IX is OCR’s 
third document, providing guidance related to an institution’s responsibilities 
related to the sexual harassment of students, released on April 4, 2011 
(“Sexual Harassment Letter”).428  Building off of the Revised Guidance, this 
Sexual Harassment Letter provides “additional guidance and practical 
examples regarding the Title IX requirements as they relate to sexual 
violence.”429  According to this Sexual Harassment Letter, sexual violence 
“refers to physical sexual acts perpetrated against a person’s will or where a 
person is incapable of giving consent due to the victim’s use of drugs or 
alcohol.”430   
The Sexual Harassment Letter reiterates that if a school “knows or 
reasonably should know about student-on-student harassment that creates a 
hostile environment, Title IX requires the school to take immediate action to 
eliminate the harassment, prevent its recurrence, and address its effects.”431  
The Sexual Harassment Letter then addresses three procedural requirements 
that schools must meet in order to comply with Title IX.   
The first is that a school must “[d]isseminate a notice of 
nondiscrimination.”432  This notice must be widely distributed to students, 
parents, employees, and even applicants.433  The second requirement is that a 
school must “[d]esignate at least one employee to coordinate its efforts to 
comply with and carry out its responsibilities under Title IX.”434  The 
coordinator is responsible for “overseeing all Title IX complaints and 
identifying and addressing any patterns or systemic problems that arise during 
the review of such complaints.”435  The final requirement is that a school must 
“[a]dopt and publish grievance procedures providing for prompt and equitable 
resolution of student and employee sex discrimination complaints.”436   
Although several courts have found that schools must address harassment 
 
428. Russlynn Ali, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter, OFFICE FOR CIV. 
RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (April 4, 2011), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list 
/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf. 
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only when they learn about it, this letter provides that “schools should take 
proactive measures to prevent sexual harassment and violence.”437  In 
addition, “if a school determines that sexual harassment that creates a hostile 
environment has occurred, it must take immediate action to eliminate the 
hostile environment, prevent its recurrence, and address its effects.”438 
Overall, although in many ways reiterating the requirements of the 
Revised Guidance and reinforcing what many courts have said in regard to a 
school’s responsibility for sexual harassment, this Sexual Harassment Letter 
makes clear that schools cannot merely react to situations that are brought to 
the attention of school administrators.  Instead, a school must have policies 
and procedures in place that assist in preventing harassment in the first 
instance.  Moreover, the Sexual Harassment Letter makes clear that sexual 
harassment can be unlawful under Title IX, even if criminal authorities do not 
have enough evidence to charge the individual involved with a crime.439  
Clearly, OCR has renewed its focus on eliminating sexual harassment from 
schools, and it will not allow schools to hide behind criminal authorities who 
cannot find evidence of a crime. 
CONCLUSION 
Title IX, and the many judicial opinions and different forms of agency 
guidance that are its progeny, have shaped and continually redefined gender 
equity law over the past four decades.  While some may debate the forty 
developments selected for inclusion in this Article, no one can debate Title 
IX’s impact on gender equity in athletics. 
Although this Article presents these forty items in chronological order 
tracking the development of the law, hopefully it is apparent to a reader that 
many of these developments merely reiterate (or clarify) requirements that 
have been around for a long time.  For example, while many continue to fight 
the use of the three-part test, it has existed since 1979, every court that has 
reviewed it has deferred to it, and the federal agency in charge of its 
application has repeatedly clarified its meaning while reinforcing its impact.  
The problem is that advocates for and against Title IX and its application 
to athletics often demonstrate no knowledge of the cases, regulations, and 
agency documents that are referenced in this Article.  As a result, they are 
uninformed about the law's true impact and continue to litigate over matters 
that courts have decided over and over again.  Perhaps a thorough 
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understanding of the full application of the law will allow the focus of gender 
equity law to move from the courtroom to efforts to truly provide comparable 
sports programs for student-athletes from both genders. 
